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The Cover: Prince Genji at a Spa

by William Pinckard

... So young a boy attracted little attention and indeed little deference from the guards. He left Genji at an east door to the main hall. He pounded on the south shutters and went inside.

"Shut it, shut it!" shrieked the woman. "The whole world can see us."

"But why do you have them closed on such a warm evening?"

"The lady from the west wing has been here since noon.

They have been at Go."

Hoping to see them at the Go board, Genji slipped from his hiding place and made his way through the door and the blinds. The shutter through which the boy had gone was still raised. Genji could see through to the west. One panel of the screen just inside had been folded back, and the curtains, which should have shielded off the space beyond, had been thrown over their frames, perhaps because of the heat. The view was unobstructed.

There was a lamp near the women. The one in silhouette with her back against a pillar — would she be the one on whom his heart was set? He looked first at her. . . .

So begins the famous passage in the third chapter of *The Tale of Genji* which, centuries later, inspired some of the most elaborate woodblock prints ever made in Japan or anywhere else. The scene of Prince Genji spying on the two court ladies at go, endlessly adapted to different circumstances, was one of the subjects the public liked best during the last two decades of the Tokugawa period.

This great novel was written between the years 1000 and 1015 by a woman of genius who is known to posterity as Murasaki Shikibu. She was a lady-in-waiting to the empress Akiko. The novel circulated at first in the form of manuscript copies and soon made her famous. It quickly became a classic, and indeed eventually achieved a status almost equal to that of the canonical Buddhist texts.

The painting of important scenes from different chapters of the novel became a popular pastime in aristocratic circles, many members of which, like ladies and gentlemen of Vic-

torian England, were trained artists. By the 13th century such paintings had evolved into a new art form called 'Genji pictures'. Guides were prepared for the use of amateur and professional artists which specified the pictorial requirements of each scene — someone standing here, two women seated over there, a lamp on that side, a distant view of a garden through the window, the season to be mid-summer, and so on.

As the novel's fame spread century after century to an ever wider public, some of these scenes became set-pieces for artists working in a variety of different forms ranging from huge, twelve-fold screens down to tiny netsuke. Some of these scenes appear in album illustrations and woodblock prints of the 17th and 18th century, but it was not until near the middle of the 19th century that Genji prints reached the height of their sumptuousness and popularity.

The impetus behind this development

came from two directions. The first was a ban on prints of actors and courtesans, a measure imposed by the Tempō Reforms of 1842, which forced artists and their publishers to turn to historical and literary themes for their subjects. The second was the publication of the novel *Nise Murasaki Inaka Genji*, 'A Sham of Murasaki's Rustic Genji', a hugely successful, affectionately written burlesque of Lady Murasaki's tale. Written by the brilliant samurai-novelist Ryūtei Tanehiko and extensively illustrated by Kunisada, it appeared in 38 installments (78 double fascicles) from 1828 to 1842. In that year the government forced the author to stop, and he committed suicide. Popular enthusiasm for the novel, however, remained at a high pitch.

In 1851 the actor Danjūrō VIII made a great hit in a dramatization of the novel under the title *Genji Moyo Furisode Hinagata*, 'Dress Patterns in Genji Style' (Japanese play titles have a flavor all their own), produced at the Ichimura Theater in Edo with costumes and sets based on Kunisada's designs. The novel and the play together created a boom in Genji-ism which lasted well into the 1860s.

Much of the credit for the success of Tanehiko's novel was due to Kunisada for his imaginative illustrations based on sketches made by Tanehiko himself. The result was that Kunisada and his pupils became, in effect, the official designers of Genji prints. His friend and rival Kuniyoshi, the great designer of warrior prints, tried his hand at some as well, but the Kunisada group had prior claim and were prolific enough to dominate the market for many years. In spite of the ban on actor prints, which remained theoretically in effect through most of the 1850s, many of the faces seen in these Genji prints are recognizable today as well-known actors of the time and would have been immediately familiar to contemporary theater-goers. But because the actors were not identified by name in the prints, as had been customary up to that time, publishers were able to keep up the pretence that they were only showing figures from classic literature.

The scenery, costumes and manners displayed in these Genji prints have more the flavor of Tanehiko's own time than of an ear-

lier age, yet the subject gave artists virtually unlimited scope for picturing elegant men and women in beautiful costumes placed against richly decorated interiors. Publishers, too, rose to the occasion by using, to an unprecedented degree, the expensive and laborious oban triptych format and by employing engravers and printers whose technical skills have never been surpassed. The Edo public, bedevilled in the last years of the Tokugawa Shogunate by economic troubles, government restrictions, and by a rising tide of malaise, found in such prints a gentler and happier world than its own, and was entranced.

The hero of Tanehiko's 'Rustic Genji' is, as the name suggests, not identical with the hero of Lady Murasaki's 11th century novel but rather a kind of 19th-century avatar. Just as the original Genji was the bastard son of the Emperor, the rustic Genji, whose name is Prince Mitsuui, is the bastard son of the Ashikaga Shogun, Yoshimasa. The plot of the novel unfolds from Prince Mitsuui's loyal efforts to unravel a conspiracy against his father's government. In the course of the action he is required to masquerade as a libertine and to engage in many amorous adventures. In its construction the novel recalls the main events of *Genji Monogatari*, and many important scenes are *mitate*, or burlesques, which depend for some of their effect on the reader's familiarity with parallel scenes in the original.

The print on this issue's cover is an oban triptych by Kunisada (signing as Toyokuni III), published by Kagaya Kichibei in 1861.

This design is titled *Hikaru-shi Onsen Asobi Oku no Zu* ('Interior View of Amusements of the Hikaru Family at a Spa'). Hikaru was Prince Genji's personal name, but it is Mitsuui who is depicted here as we can tell by the 'shrimp's tail' headdress adopted by the actor who played the part on stage. He is holding a bamboo flute and is waiting for the attendant with the samisen to tune her instrument. The towel behind the go board displays a 'water-wheel' pattern which was probably the trademark of a well known hot-springs inn of the period.

(From the Ishi Press Collection)

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Go World News

International News

Korea Triumphs in 1st SBS Cup

The result in the first SBS Cup was a triumph for the host country Korea, which defeated Japan and China without having to field its top player Cho Hun-hyun.

To update the report given in GW65, after Kato lost to Liu of China —

Liu lost to Lee Chang-ho 5-dan, who then lost to Rin Kaiho, playing for Japan. This gave Rin some revenge for his loss to Lee in the Tongyang Securities Cup final. Rin continued promisingly by defeating Ma Xiaochun 9-dan of China, but then lost to Seo Bong-soo 9-dan of Korea. Seo then defeated China's final player, Nie Weiping, to secure the prize of 100 million won (about US\$150,000) for Korea. The above games were played in Seoul on 7-9 February.

Lee Defeats Cho Chikun

Fresh from his triumph in the Tongyang Securities Cup, Korea's youthful world champion Lee Chang-ho has scored another success. In a special game sponsored by the Seoul TV station MBC, Lee defeated Cho Chikun by 3 1/2 points. Cho visited Seoul for the game, played on 23 February. The TV program obtained a rating of 17.3%, which shows how much of a national hero Lee has become.

5th Fujitsu Cup: Japanese Stars Eliminated Che Zewu of China Shines

The Fujitsu Cup is always eventful, which is perhaps not surprising in a five-round knockout tournament featuring the world's best players, and this year was no exception. Most of the upsets were suffered by high-powered Japanese stars, but a youthful world champion from Korea also made an ignominious exit in the first round. The big surprise of the 5th Cup was the excellent performance of the little-known Chinese professional Che Zewu. Che, better known as an amateur, since he won the 1989 WAGC, beat Lee Chang-ho 5-dan of Korea, the Tongyang Securities Cup world champion, in Round 1,

then vanquished the Japanese champion, Kobayashi Koichi, in the second round. Che became only the second Chinese player ever to defeat Kobayashi.

The Kisei was not the only player to come to grief, as a full listing of the results in the opening rounds will show.

Round 1 (4 April). Rin Kaiho (Japan) defeated Liu 5-dan (Chinese Taipei), Perng 5-dan (Chinese Taipei) d. Alexei Lazarev (Europe), Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan (China) d. Fujisawa Shuko (Japan), Seo (previously spelt by us as Suh) Bongsoo 9-dan (Korea) d. Zhang Wendong 8-dan (China), Che Zewu 7-dan (China) d. Lee 5-dan (Korea), Otake Hideo 9-dan (Japan) d. Fernando Aguilar (South America), Ishida Yoshio 9-dan (Japan) d. Yoo 5-dan (Korea), Yu Bin 9-dan (China) d. Yoda Norimoto 8-dan (Japan).

Round 2 (6 April). Cho Chikun (Japan) d. Yu Bin, O Rissei (Japan) d. Seo, Che d. Kobayashi Koichi, Liu d. Takemiya Masaki (Japan), Nie Weiping 9-dan (China) d. Rin, Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (China) d. Ishida, Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan (Korea) d. Perng, Otake d. Michael Redmond 7-dan (North America).

Quarterfinal results. Liu d. Cho Hun-hyun, O Rissei d. Che, Ma d. Cho Chikun, Otake d. Nie.

Japan Wins 6th Super Go

After losing four out of five Super Go series, Japan has finally put another win on the board but not before having a scare. As reported in our previous issue, two good wins by Kobayashi Satoru had given Japan a 7-5 lead, but once again China's famed 'iron goalkeeper' looked like frustrating Japan's hopes. Nie Weiping defeated Kobayashi and Hane Yasumasa to even the score at 7-7.

The showdown between the rival captains took place at the Nihon Ki-in on 30 March 1992. Nie was the favourite, as he had won all three previous playoffs between the team captains (they took place in the 1st to 3rd series),

but Kato Masao of Japan rose to the occasion. The highlight of their game was an aggressive attempt by Nie to capture a Kato group. The players in the pressroom couldn't work out if it should live or die, but Kato's skill at *shinogi* saved the group and earned Japan its second victory.

No time was wasted starting the 7th Super Go. On 1 April, Komatsu Hideki, who had vowed to make up for his poor showing in the Super Go so far, defeated China's lead-off player, Liu 4-dan.

News from Japan

Kobayashi Wins 29th Shusai Prize

Kobayashi has been awarded the Shusai Prize, which honours the outstanding player of the previous year, for the 4th time in a row and the 5th time overall. (See page 8 for a report on the *Kido* Prizes for 1991.)

Kobayashi Sets Kisei Record after Toughest Defence

The biggest surprise in Japanese go for years has been the superb fight put up by Yamashiro Hiroshi, a player who has yet to win an open title, in his challenge for the 17th Kisei title. Kobayashi just barely scraped through his title defence with a perilous half-point win in the 7th game — perilous because at one point in the endgame Yamashiro took the lead. Kobayashi related that at this point he was thinking to himself, 'So this is how I lose the Kisei.'

Yamashiro was previously best known for two unsuccessful challenges for the Honinbo title (he lost 1-4 in 1986 and 0-4 in 1987, both times to Takemiya), but his shrewd, flexible play and tenacious, never-say-die fighting spirit in the Kisei title match show that he has matured into a formidable player. He actually held the upper hand over Kobayashi throughout the series, never falling behind until the bitter end and always keeping the defending champion under tremendous pressure.

Yamashiro won the first two games, Kobayashi caught up, then the challenger again took the lead in the 5th game. For the first time ever in the Kisei title, Kobayashi found himself faced with a *kadoban* (a game in

which one side could lose a match). Last year also, of course, the title match with Kato went to seven games, but it was the other way around, with Kato having to fight to catch up.

The last game of the series was memorable. Kobayashi found a brilliant move that gained unconditional life for a group that seemed doomed, at best, to ko. In his shock or disappointment Yamashiro overlooked a sacrifice that he could have extracted from Kobayashi as the price of living.

When the game ended, the players agreed it was a half-point and instead of counting the score started reviewing the game — though without moving any stones. The referee, Iwata Tatsuaki, had to use the game record to get an official result.

Kobayashi's win set a new Kisei record of seven titles in a row. It also enabled him to draw level with Sakata's seven successive Honinbo titles and puts him within shooting distance of Takagawa's nine.

There is no telling if he will make it, though. His match against Yamashiro was expected to be his easiest defence, yet it turned out to be his hardest. In tournament go, you can't take anything for granted.

Full results:

Game 1 (16, 17 Jan. 1992). Yamashiro (B) won by resignation.

Game 2 (29, 30 Jan.). Yamashiro (W) won by 4 1/2 points.

Game 3 (5, 6 Feb.). Kobayashi (W) won by 1 1/2 points.

Game 4 (19, 20 Feb.). Kobayashi (B) won by 5 1/2 points.

Game 5 (26, 27 Feb.). Yamashiro (B) won by 6 1/2 points.

Game 6 (11, 12 March). Kobayashi (B) won by 4 1/2 points.

Game 7 (18, 19 March). Kobayashi (W) won by 1/2 point.

Takemiya Defends Judan Title

Takemiya Masaki has scored one of his most impressive triumphs, defeating an opponent against whom he has usually done badly in the past. When Kobayashi Koichi became the Judan challenger, Takemiya publicly vowed to rebuff him with straight wins. No one gave him much chance of making good on his boast, considering that he had lost all four

17th Meijin League (as of 7 May 1992) Title-holder: Kobayashi Koichi

Rank	Player	R	T	C	Y	F	O	I	A	K	Score
1	Rin Kaiho	—	0	0	0	1	1		0		2 — 4
2	Takemiya	1	—	0	1		0	0			2 — 3
3	Cho Chikun	1	1	—		0	0		0	1	3 — 3
4	Yoda	1	0		—			1	1	1	4 — 1
5	Fujisawa S.	0		1		—	0	0	1	0	2 — 4
6	Otake	0	1	1		1	—	1	1		5 — 1
7	Iwata T.		1		0	1	0	—	0	0	2 — 4
7	Awaji	1		1	0	0	0	1	—	1	4 — 3
7	Komatsu H.			0	0	1		1	0	—	2 — 3

Note: Players are ranked according to results in the previous league.

of his previous title matches with Kobayashi, but he came close, dropping only the 3rd game. Takemiya played very powerful go and was very satisfied with his performance.

The results:

Game 1 (5 March). Takemiya (W) won by resig.

Game 2 (26 March). Takemiya (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (2 April). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (16 April). Takemiya (B) won by resig.

Kobayashi Honinbo Challenger Yet Again

Kobayashi Koichi has set a record in the Honinbo title about which he probably has mixed feelings: he is the first player to become

(Continued on page 49)

47th Honinbo League (as of 7 May 1992) Title-holder: Cho Chikun

Rank	Player	KK	R	KS	O	KM	I	KH	C	Score	Place
1	Kobayashi K.	—	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	6 — 1	1
2	Rin Kaiho	0	—	1	0	1	0	1	0	3 — 4	—
3	Kataoka S.	0	0	—	0	0	1	0	1	2 — 5	—
4	Otake	1	1	1	—	0	0	1	0	4 — 3	2
5	Kato Masao	0	0	1	1	—	1	0	0	3 — 4	—
5	Imamura	0	1	0	1	0	—	0	0	2 — 5	—
5	Komatsu H.	0	0	1	0	1	1	—	1	4 — 3	3
5	Chan Ka Yui	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	—	4 — 3	3

Note: Players are ranked according to results in the previous league.

1991 in Review

The stars of Japanese go in 1991 were, of course, the winners of the important titles, but as usual they were monopolized by the same small group. The only event out of the ordinary was the very welcome comeback of Fujisawa Shuko, who set a record as the oldest player to take a title. However, there were many other players who turned in good performances that deserve to be remembered. To flesh out the picture of the go scene provided by our tournament reports, we would like to present a detailed round-up of Japanese go in 1991, including prizes, prize money, and statistics.

1991 Title Matches

February

3rd Women's Meijin: Sugiuchi Kazuko (challenger) defeated Aoki Kikuyo 2-1.

March

15th Kisei: Kobayashi Koichi d. Kato Masao (challenger) 4-3.

38th NHK Cup: Yoda d. O Meien.

13th Kakusei: Takemiya d. Otake.

10th NEC Cup: Kato Masao d. Otake.

21st New Stars: Komatsu Hideki d. Tei Meiko

6th NEC New Stars: O Meien d. Tei Meiko (O and Tei are brothers).

April

29th Judan: Takemiya d. Cho Chikun (challenger) 3-2.



Takemiya and Rin

May

13th World Amateur Go Championship: Imamura Fumiaki (Japan).

June

4th Japan-China Tengen playoff: Rin Kaiho d. Nie Weiping 2-1.

July


46th Honinbo: Cho Chikun d. Kobayashi Koichi (challenger) 4-2.

August

4th Fujitsu Cup: Cho Chikun (Qian Yuping of China forfeited the final).

16th Gosei: Kobayashi Koichi d. Kobayashi Satoru (challenger) 3-2.

1st Ryusei (a tournament sponsored by cable TV): Cho Chikun d. Ishida Yoshio.



Rivals: Cho and Kobayashi

September

13th Women's Kakusei: Aoki Kikuyo d. Miyazaki Shimako.

16th Shinjin-O: Cho Sonjin d. Ryu Shikun 2-1.

24th Haya-go Championship: Cho Chikun d. Yuki Satoshi.

October

16th Meijin: Kobayashi Koichi d. Rin Kaiho (challenger) 4-1.

39th Oza: Fujisawa Shuko (challenger) d. Hane Yasumasa 3-1.



Shuko and Hane

November

32nd Okan (Crown): Ogata Masaki d. Hane (challenger).

3rd World Women's Amateur Go Championship: Sato Akiko (Japan).

December

17th Tengen: Rin Kaiho d. Kato (challenger) 3-1.

10th Women's Honinbo: Nakazawa Ayako
d. Kobayashi Chizu (challenger) 2-1.

4th Japan-China Meijin playoff: Kobayashi
d. Ma Xiaochun 2-0.

1991 Prize Money

This is a list of the prize money (in yen) offered for titles in 1991. We have listed the titles in order of prize amounts, which does not coincide with their rankings. For example, the Gosei title, as one of the seven open titles, is ranked above the NEC Cup. Note that the open titles also offer 'game fees' not included in the sums given below (for example, that added an extra ¥9,000,000 to Kobayashi's Kisei earnings and ¥6,800,000 to his Meijin prize, while Cho picked up a match fee of ¥6,200,000 in the Honinbo title).

Kisei: ¥32,000,000
Meijin: ¥25,000,000
Honinbo: ¥22,000,000
Fujitsu Cup: ¥15,000,000
NEC Cup: ¥10,000,000
Judan: ¥9,000,000
Oza: ¥8,300,000
Tengen: ¥7,700,000
Gosei: ¥5,600,000
Women's Meijin: ¥4,500,000
Women's Honinbo: ¥4,500,000
Kakusei: ¥4,500,000
NHK Cup: ¥4,000,000
Haya-go Ch'ship: ¥3,800,000
Ryusei: ¥3,000,000
Shinjin-O: ¥2,100,000

Kido Prizes for 1991

This year *Kido* made some changes in its annual prizes, abolishing three of them and creating some new ones. First, the committee of go journalists that chooses the prize winners decided to do away with three of the prizes that are usually grouped together: the fighting spirit prize, the prize for technique, and the special merit prize. The reason was that in the past these prizes have been considered quite a step down from the top prize, for the most outstanding player of the year; that meant that they were not awarded to top players who were in contention for the top prize, but then the result would be that the

player who was, let's say, the number two candidate for the top prize might not get any prize at all. To replace these three prizes, the committee instituted a prize for the number two player (or players, as it can be awarded to two people) of the year, called 'prize for the outstanding player'. (The prizes for 1990 are listed in GW63. Note that we have had to revise the English translation to accommodate the new prizes.) The committee also abolished the international prize: this prize was instituted when international tournaments were a novelty, and it was felt there was no longer any need for special recognition of good results in international play. A second new prize was created, for most games played during the year.

The winners for 1991 were:

1. The most outstanding player: Kobayashi Koichi (fourth year in a row, fifth overall). The award was not unanimous this year, as there was support for Shuko, in recognition of his winning the Oza title at the age of 66 and after having suffered two major illnesses. Astonishingly, Shuko has never received the prize — in the days when he held the Kisei title for six years in a row, he would spend the rest of the year drinking, so his overall results were often very bad. The conclusion this time, as before, was that winning just one title was not enough for the top prize.

2. The outstanding player: Fujisawa Shuko.

3. The 'new face' prize: Cho Sonjin.

4. The outstanding woman player: Aoki Kikuyo (36-10, including 15-6 against male players).

5. Most wins (players over 6-dan): Komatsu Hideki 7-dan (38).

6. Best winning percentage (over 6-dan): Kudo Norio 9-dan (84.4%).

7. Most successive wins (over 6-dan): O Rissei 9-dan (16).

8. Most games played: Ryu Shikun 4-dan (59).



Aoki Kikuyo



Cho Sonjin

1991 in Statistics

A look at the statistics for 1991 should confirm the worthiness of the above prize-winners and show who their main competitors were. The statistic that made the most news was Kobayashi's feat in topping 100 million yen for the second year in a row. His earnings rival those of Japan's top professional golfers.



加藤 正夫

Kato



大竹 英雄

Otake

Top Prize Money Winners

1. Kobayashi Koichi: ¥101,340,000 (about \$790,000)
2. Cho Chikun: ¥69,460,000
3. Rin Kaiho: ¥43,300,000
4. Kato Masao: ¥37,220,000
5. Takemiya: ¥27,020,000
6. Fujisawa Shuko: ¥23,170,000
7. Otake: ¥22,700,000
8. Yoda: ¥18,850,000
9. Awaji: ¥17,210,000
10. O Rissei: ¥16,340,000



依田 紀基

Yoda



淡路 修三

Awaji

Best winning percentages (over 6-dan)

1. Kudo Norio: 84.3% (27 wins, 5 losses)
2. Ohira Shuzo: 79.4% (27-7)
3. O Rissei: 78.2% (36-10)
4. Ito Yoji 8-dan: 75% (25-8-1 *jigo*)
5. Yamashiro Hiroshi: 73.9% (34-12)
6. O Meien 8-dan: 72.9% (35-13)
7. Aoki Shinichi 7-dan: 71.8% (23-9)
8. Komatsu Hideki: 71.7% (38-15)
9. Kataoka Satoshi: 70.6% (30-12)
10. Sonoda Yasutaka 8-dan: 70.6% (20-8)

Most Wins

1. Komatsu: 38-15
2. O Rissei: 36-10
3. O Meien: 35-13; Yoda: 35-20
5. Yamashiro: 34-12
6. Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan: 32-14-1 *jigo*
7. Imamura Yoshiaki 7-dan: 31-13-1 *jigo*; Awaji: 31-20
9. Kataoka: 30-12; Cho Chikun: 30-17; Kato: 30-19.
12. Kobayashi Koichi: 29-21

It is, of course, difficult for a top title holder to make the top ten in this or the previous category, as most of his games are against other players of the title-holder class. Some players who missed making the list were:

- Otake: 27-18 (14th)
 Fujisawa Shuko: 26-15 (17th)
 Kobayashi Satoru: 24-13 (22nd)
 Ishida Yoshio: 21-12 (26th)
 Rin: 20-19 (28th)
 Michael Redmond: 19-11
 Hane: 17-18
 Takemiya: 12-15
 Sakata: 10-12

Most Successive Wins

O Rissei: 16; Kudo: 14; Cho Chikun, Ohira, Kataoka, Yasuda: 10; Cho Chikun, Ishida Yoshio, Hane, Sonoda Yuichi, O Meien (twice), Fukui Susumu, Aoki Shinichi, Imamura Yoshiaki: 9.

Most Successive Wins (under 7-dan)

Morita Michihiro 6-dan: 21; Aoki Kikuyo: 18; Yamada Kimio 4-dan: 13.

Most Wins (under 7-dan)

1. Ryu Shikun 4-dan: 47-12
2. Aoki Kikuyo: 36-10
3. Yamada Kimio 4-dan: 35-10
4. Arimura Hiroshi 4-dan: 30-10-1.

Another woman player besides Aoki to do exceptionally well was Nakazawa Ayako, Women's Honinbo, who came 10th with 26-17-1.

Best Winning Percentage (under 7-dan)

1. Hane Naoki 2-dan: 87% (23-3-1)
2. Ryu Shikun: 79.6%
3. Aoki Kikuyo: 78.2%
4. Omori Yasushi 5-dan: 78.1%

The 4th Japan–China Tengen Playoff

One of the most interesting matches of last year was the clash between Rin and Nie in the annual Japan–China Tengen playoff.

After three failures in this playoff, China was pinning its hopes on its trump card, Nie Weiping, the player who has been awarded the honorary title of Go Saint by the Chinese Weiqi Association. His first appearance in a title playoff between China and Japan generated extraordinary interest in the match among the Chinese media and general public.



China's ace, Nie Weiping, finally makes an appearance in a Japan–China title playoff. In recent years Nie has tended to concentrate on international tournaments, neglecting internal titles, so he had not represented his country in either the Meijin or Tengen playoffs. He remedied that in March 1991, taking the Tianyuan (= Tengen) title from Liu 3–0 and so earning the right to face Rin in the 4th Tengen playoff. Rin had defeated Kobayashi Koichi 3–1 in the 16th Tengen title match, held at the end of 1990.

Game One

White: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Black: Nie Weiping 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2; **time:** 3 hours each.

Played in Hangzhou City on 21 June 1991.

Commentary by Ohira Shuzo 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50). Nie's brilliancy, Rin's two slack moves


When Black plays 9, having 7 at A would make better balance, but if Black plays 7 at A, White will switch 8 to 9.

The aim of the forcing sequence from 26 is to build up strength here before continuing the attack with 32. Black makes the standard answer with 27. Countering with 27 at B is possible but complicated.

White 38. If at C, Black's peep at D will be just right. Black will have no trouble moving out.

Once Black pushes up at 39, it is very hard to stop this group from settling itself.

The aim of 40 is to make *miai* of 43 and 45, but it backfires, for it provokes the brilliancy of Black 41.




Dia. 1

Instead of 40, White could play 1 in Dia. 1, but that would let Black extend at 6 in sente,

so he would not be under much pressure.


Rin commented that he should have played at 1 in *Dia. 2*. Ohira showed the continuation to 21, which gives a superior result to that in the figure.



Dia. 2

Black 41 very cleverly refutes the twin aims of 40. Perhaps it was the shock of seeing this move that led Rin to make another dubious move.

Instead of 42, White should atari at 1 in *Dia. 3*, then connect at 3. If the sequence to 17 followed, White would still be in the game.



Dia. 3

11: connects

When Black plays 43, White falls into shortage of liberties. He pushes out with 44 but can't block at A after Black 45. Instead, he must backtrack with 46, letting Black lay waste to the left side with 47 on.

The game has been decided in the fighting here.

Figure 2 (51–73). Bankruptcy of Rin's fuseki strategy

The black group is immune to attack after 55. Black has settled himself comfortably inside White's sphere of influence.

The centre thickness White has built up is his consolation for losing his left-side territory.

The only problem is that there's nowhere to use this thickness: all of Black's groups are rock solid. Yet the centre is too small and too open to set up a moyo.





Figure 2 (51–73)



Dia. 4

Rin switches to profit with 62. Ohira: 'If instead White blocks at 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black lives with 2. Next, 'a' and 'b' are *miai* for Black, so White can't get a big side territory. If White tries to block off the centre with 'd', Black 'e' becomes an ideal point, expanding Black's top area while reducing the centre.'

White 62 and 64 show that Rin has abandoned his fuseki strategy of emphasizing the left side. Nie is content to nibble away at the centre with 71 and 73. If next White A, Black will play at B.





Figure 3 (74-100)



Dia. 5

Figure 3 (74-100). A flower blossoms.

White 74. Rin has lost interest in his left side.

White 76. If at 79, it will be hard for White to do anything with his four stones after Black 76.

Black 79. Referring to this *ponnuki* after the game, Nie said: 'A flower blossomed.' The shape is indeed just like a four-petaled flower.

White 92. White decides to take sente rather than save his four stones to the left.

Black 99. If at A, White will attach at B.

White 100. If White played at 1 in Dia. 5, his invasion would probably succeed, but his centre thickness would disappear, so there would be no improvement in his prospects.

When you are behind, there are two pos-

sible strategies. One is to start a desperate fight, the all-or-nothing approach. The other is to play patiently and wait for a misstep by the opponent. White 100 shows that Rin is following the latter strategy.





Figure 4 (101-150)

29: ko; 40: ko; 47: at 25



Dia. 6


Figure 4 (101-150). Nie plays cautiously.

Nie takes care to avoid offering Rin the chance he's hoping for. After playing sente moves up to 15, he defends with the ultra-solid diagonal move of 17. Playing here instead of the usual jump to A is tantamount to a declaration of victory.


The top is the last area where White can hope to create confusion. He starts the final fight by peeping at 20. White could make the more aggressive-looking move of 1 in Dia. 6, but he doesn't gain when Black answers at 2, as he loses the threat of White 'a'. White 3 and 5 make *miai* of 'b' and 'c', but that is not enough to worry Black.

White has no reasonable ko threats, so he has to connect at 30.

Black 33. If Black cuts at 1 in *Dia. 7*, he can capture the white stone, but White counters with the endgame tesuji of 4, setting up a squeeze on the outside. Instead of 5 —



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 8. If Black descends at 5, he will get into trouble.

Black has no intention of fighting strongly at the top. His territory there is already open to the left, because of the marked white stone, so White's sente sequence from 34 doesn't bother him. He is content with having moved out into the centre with 33.

White 44. If Black cuts at B, White will play C.

The placement of 45 creates the possibility of attacking this group later.





Figure 5 (151-197)

Figure 5 (151-197). A win to make Chinese fans happy

White 64. If omitted, Black can get the ko in *Dia. 9*.

Black 97 makes miai of A and B.



Dia. 9

This game was decided by White's mistakes in the fighting at the bottom, that is, 40 and 42 in Figure 1. Thereafter, the contest became one-sided. White was never given a chance to get back into the game. Usually it takes more than one setback to put Rin out of the running — this game is the exception, which is an indication of how skilfully Nie played.

To Chinese go fans it must have looked as if the tide had finally turned.

White resigns after Black 197.

(Adapted from the Tokyo Shimbun.)

Before the playoff began, the Japanese side had asked for the first two games to be played on successive days, but the Chinese had objected. It was lucky for Rin that they did. His play in the second game showed how much he had benefited from the rest day. He was probably a little tired when he played the first game, because he had played the semifinal of the Tongyang Securities Cup in Seoul on 13 and 15 June (he was lucky he beat Cho Chikun 2-0 and so didn't have to play a third game on 17 June), flown home to Tokyo for one day, then come to China for this match.

The Japan-China Tengen Playoff

1st (1988). Cho Chikun (Japan) defeated Liu Xiaoguang (China) 2-0. Played in Tokyo on 20 and 21 June.

2nd (1989). Cho defeated Liu 2-0. Played in Shanghai on 23 and 24 August.

3rd (1990). Rin Kaiho (Japan) defeated Liu 2-1. Played in Tokyo on 23, 24, and 26 June.

It's interesting that Japan has not yet been represented by a Japanese national. (All the above games are given in the 1989-1991 Ranka Yearbooks.)

Game Two

White: Nie Weiping

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played on 23 June 1991.

Commentary by Ohira Shuzo 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-50)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1-50). Nie's *mochikomi*

Black 15. If at 16, White 15 leads to a leisurely game.

Black 25 is a fierce move. The usual strategy would be to approach at Black 34; if White A, Black plays B.

The Chinese camp expressed dissatisfaction with the result to 39. White 12 has become a painful *mochikomi* (a loss without compensation).

Ohira: 'If White plays 26 at 31, Black will invade the corner at C. If White switches 30 to 1 in Dia. 1, Black plays 2 to 6. If White now defends at 'a', Black can cut at 'b', because the ladder is favourable; if instead White defends with 'c', Black gets a nasty peep at 'a'.' Neither result is good for White.

White 38 is very bad: the exchange for 39

makes 12 even more of a *mochikomi*. White should have omitted 28 so as to leave the *aji* of White D.






Figure 2 (41-75)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3
9: at 6

Figure 2 (41-75). A surprising lapse in the corner

White 50. White could also attack at A. Up to 60 he flattens out Black's bottom territory, but overall he is thin while Black is thick. Black has the lead.

When Black plays 63, White must invade at 64 before Black hanes at B.

Black 69. If at 1 in Dia. 2, a ko follows. White has ko threats at A in the figure, so Black plays 69.

White 72 is an unthinking move, although it was not played quickly: Nie took over a dozen minutes on it. Ohira: 'White 72 astonished me. This makes Black C sente, which is awful. Descending at 1 in Dia. 3 is the only move; the result is a seki. What with the cutting point at 'a', this is much better for White than the result in the figure.'

Black 73 launches an attack on the white group here. This was why Rin descended at 65.





Figure 3 (76-100)



Dia. 4

Figure 3 (76-100). Harassing the weak group

White 76 is courageous. After the game Nie commented that he should have played 76 at 77, but then Black A would give Black a clear lead in territory. Even so, Black 77 is an ideal attacking move: the thinness of the white group is painfully exposed.


Having to attach on the side where Black is strong with 78 shows how much trouble White is in. If he attaches on the other side, at 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black will set up a double attack on this group and the one at the bottom.

Black 81 is a clever move. Ohira: 'If White connects at 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black will connect solidly at 2. After 4 and 6, White has quite a tough time. Without the forcing move (the marked black stone), White easily settles his

group with 'a'.

In the figure, White has zero eye shape. He plays all-out with 84, but the game gets tougher and tougher for him with 85 and 87. The only thing is that Black could also have played 85 at 86. Ohira: 'That would actually be what you'd expect. Well, no matter how he plays, the position is good for Black.' After the game Rin commented: 'The game was decided by Black's *yoritsuki* on the right. Fortunately it went well for me.' (*Yoritsuki* refers to picking up profit by harassing a weak group.)

White is forced to flee towards the bottom. Black is content to let him link up, as in the process he picks up profit on the side. Ohira: 'Playing 99 at B would make things very hard for White, but perhaps Rin was worried that White might defiantly play 99. Black takes enough profit with 99.'



Dia. 5



Rin Kaiho has enjoyed a lot of success in international matches, winning the 1990 Fujitsu Cup (after two second places) and 1990 Japan-China Tengen playoff, then defeating Cho Chikun in the 1991 Tongyang Securities Cup semifinal.





Figure 4 (101-150)



Dia. 6

Figure 4 (101-150). Black leads.

White links up in sente, but Black takes adequate profit with 5. He is clearly ahead in territory.

The sente capture of 17 and 19 is very painful for White.

White 26 defends against Black 42, of course, and also aims at making some territory around here. Black forestalls that with 27. Once again White is forced to seek a painful life, securing minimum eye shape with 28 and 30. He has to be careful not to let Black build thickness in the centre or Black A will become a threat.

White 34 is also painful, but if White captures at 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black plays 2 to 6 in sente, then cuts off the centre left stones with 8.

Black 39. The exchange for 40 is bad for Black. Instead, he should attach at 40 — if White B, Black C; if White 39, Black C is again good.

Black is way ahead — White only has ter-

ritory on the top left and bottom right — but Rin's endgame play becomes erratic. He gains nothing from exchanging 49 for 50. Also ...





Figure 5 (151-200)



Dia. 7

Figure 5 (151-200). Erratic play by Rin but ...

Black 55. Cutting at 56 is a little thicker. Black 55 is worth ten points, but White 56 creates some uneasiness in Black's centre position.

Black 65 is sente: Black A next would destroy White's eye shape, so 66 is forced.

Black 79 is forced because Black missed the cut at 56. It loses points — Rin looked disgusted with himself as he played it —

but Black can't play 1 in *Dia. 7*. Ohira: 'If Black 1, White 2. If he counters with 3, White cuts off the centre stones with 4 to 8. So even with 77 it would have been better to cut at 85.'

White picks up some bonus territory up to 82. Luckily for Black, however, he is still safely ahead.




Figure 6 (201-271)

42: captures (at 22); 71: ko (above 22); Black wins and connects the ko.

Figure 6 (201-271). Nie's endgame tesuji

Ohira was startled by White 22 to 26. 'There was a fantastic move here. I didn't notice it . . . The hane of 26 is clever. Black has lost four points in the corner.' Black loses the stones in the bottom left corner and has to take the white stones above off the board. Rin was lucky he had such a big lead.

Black wins by 6 1/2 points.

Game Three

After two one-sided games, the third was a fitting climax to the series. It was a violent struggle featuring upset after upset, making it one of the most spectacular games of 1991. In our commentary Kato Masao responds to questions posed by an amateur player.

White: Nie Weiping

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played on 25 June 1991.

Commentary by Kato Masao 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-48). Hard to approve of the new move

Q: I've never seen the block of 14 before. Is this a joseki? What is Black worried about if he omits 27?

I haven't seen White 14 before either. It's quite possible this move hasn't been played by any Japanese players. Apparently Cho Hun-

hyun of Korea was advocating this move. But I don't think that this result is very good when Black pokes his head out with 15 and 17.





Figure 1 (1-48)



Dia. 1

If Black doesn't play 27, White can play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* in sente. White then secures a large base with 5 and 7, which is upsetting for Black.

Black has no reason to be dissatisfied with the result to 34.

White 36 is solid. Invading at A on the right side is also possible.

The moves from 40 to 48 look reasonable.






Figure 2 (49-90)
56: connects



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Figure 2 (49-90). An effective attack

Q: Black attacks with the capping move of 49, but he doesn't seem to have made much profit when White lives up to 90. Has Black 49 failed to accomplish anything?

Not so. Being able to push at 81 in sente is big, and Black also takes profit with 83 to 89. The only thing is that Black has to watch out for White's pushing through at A and cutting. Because if his connection is severed, the group at the top only has one eye.

To go back a bit, White 70 in response to Black 69 is an all-out move. That is to say, it gave Black scope to force first with 1 and 3 in Dia. 2 before pushing through with 5. If White counters with 6, he will lose his corner after 7 to 11, which would be terrible. So, instead of 6, he will probably play the variation shown in Dia. 3. Black is now thinner than White, so he may not like this.

Figure 3 (91-115). Breaking through

Q: The sequence from 95 to 101 is mystifying.

Why did it turn out like this? After going to the trouble of enclosing the top, White seems to lose points.

Black 91 is a good move.

The moves from 95 to 101 of course have their own inevitability. If White plays 96 at 1 in Dia. 4, Black connects at 2, creating a cutting point at 4 after 3, so White's five stones are cut adrift, which is bad.





Figure 3 (91-115)



Dia. 4

Black of course has no grounds for dissatisfaction with the sequence up to the capture of 101. However, White has also captured a stone with 100, making him thick in the centre, so the issue is still undecided.

White 102. If instead White makes an invasion at 107, Black plays solidly at A, taking all the interest out of the position for White.

Instead of Black 103, extending at B should be good enough.

Black 107 is also the kind of all-out move you make when you are behind.

Black 115 defends against the threat of White C.




Figure 4 (116-140)






Figure 5 (141-175)
61: ko (below 58)



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Figure 4 (116-140). A slack move

Q: It puzzles me why White doesn't link up with A after playing 18 and 20.

White considers that A is still too small. Even if Black captures him by descending at A, he's still got the *aji* of the hane at B, so he hardly loses anything.

More important, Black 33 is a very slack move. If instead he had reinforced with 1 and 3 in Dia. 5, Black would probably have had an easier job winning. If White tries to cut with 4 on, Black moves out a step at a time with 5 on. White cuts with 10, but Black should have nothing to worry about after turning at 11.

Having his position flattened out with 34 to 40 is very painful for Black.

Figure 5 (141-175). A sparkling tesuji

Q: How was the trade from 41?

Why doesn't Black fight the ko after jumping in at 57?

White 42 is a tesuji flash. If Black answers by connecting at 1 in Dia. 6, White cuts at 2. A capturing race follows after 3 to 6, but Black loses it after Black 'a', White 'b'.

When Black lives inside White's territory with 43 on, it might seem that he has profited, but he has made White thick in the centre, so the truth is rather that this is a painful result for Black. Black hurts his position at this stage, I think.

Concerning the ko after 58, even if Black fights this ko, White lives by attaching at 62 anyway. That means that this ko is not so serious.

If Black answers White 54 by connecting at 60, White cuts at 59, placing the whole black group in danger. Even so, White's getting a white stone in place at 50 means that black's group comes in for a lot of harassment.





Figure 6 (176-200)
84: ko (below 81); 87: ko



Dia. 7

Figure 6 (176-200). White ahead

Q: If Black has to connect at 83 after White answers his ko threat of 81 by capturing at 82, then it seems to me that Black has suffered a major loss. Was Black 81 an invalid ko threat?

There certainly seems to be something erratic about Black's play. If this is what's going to happen, meekly connecting at 83 looks better than playing 77, but Black would seem to have no chance of winning when White pushed down at 85.

If Black uses 83 to cut at A, White recaptures the ko, and the ko fight is unreasonable for Black. If he loses the ko, White will cut at 83, and his large group will die.

However, that doesn't mean that Black has suffered a large loss just because White captured at 82. The reason is that Black has taken sente and been able to make the large connection at 83. To begin with, even if the ko fight in the top left corner had been favourable for Black, in an emergency White can always live with 1 to 7 in Dia. 7. That's why I said this ko wasn't so big. In fact, one even wonders if

White shouldn't have used 82 to push down at 85 — that would probably also have put White ahead.

By the time White plays 100, Black can no longer afford to give the komi.





Figure 7 (201-237)

ko (over 6): 12, 15, 18, 25, 30, 33, 36



Dia. 8

Figure 7 (201-237). White slips up.

Next a ko begins in the bottom left corner. What kind of a ko is this?

White's aims in playing a ko with 6 and 8 are first of all to make Black give way by connecting at A, then on top of that to pull out his peep at 10 with B, thereby reducing Black to minimal eye shape.

However, White 20 was questionable answer to Black 19. Black 23 becomes sente, so White finds himself forced to answer 31 at 32. The option of linking up at C lightens the burden of the ko fight on Black.

White had to play 20 at 1 in Dia. 8: this avoids giving Black a connection. Locally the atari of White 'a' will be sente, so in that sense also this variation is more profitable for White than the one played in the game.

With the pressure taken off him in the ko fight, Black is able to switch to 37. Needless to say, this is the largest endgame move.

If this is what was going to happen, White would have been better off keeping 6 and 8 in reserve and defending the top right with D.

The game is starting to feel like an upset again.





Figure 8 (238-263)
47: connects (at 42)



Dia. 9
2: ends the ko

Figure 8 (238-263). White had ko threats . . .

Another trade took place in the ko fight at the top. Which side profited?

Black 39 is incredibly aggressive. The blood probably rushed to Nie's head for a moment when Black made the hane at 41. Not, of course, that White feels at all inclined to compromise with 38 at 39 or 40 at 42.

A large ko follows the throw-in at 56. Take a good look at the board here. If White wins the ko, capturing at A, then connects below 40, everything dies: Black's corner group and his group on the outside. All White needs is one big ko threat and Black will collapse.

But the ko threat of 58 is the losing move. White loses points in the trade to 63: the seal is set on victory for Black.

Actually Black had a better threat than 58 at the bottom. The black group can't live if White plays 1 and 3 in Dia. 9. If Black 'a' after 5, White 'b'; if instead Black 'c', then White 'a' — this is *sanmoku-nakade* (a three-point big eye), not a *seki*.

It's very easy to miss the ko threat of 1 in Dia. 9. Actually I also believed that White couldn't kill the group even with two moves, but I heard that Ohira Shuzo pointed out this variation.




Figure 9 (264-368)

70: ko (left of 67); 73: ko; 75: connects (left of 67); ko (over 83); 89, 92, 95, 98, 101; 111: ko (right of 78); 114: ko; 120: ko (left of 115); 121: ko (above 108); 122: takes three stones; 123: ko (right of 78); 125: connects (at 108); 145: connects (right of 115); 153: ko (above 150); 156: ko; 157: throw-in (two spaces left of 115); 158: takes; 159: ko (above 150); 162: ko; 165: ko; 167: connects the ko

Figure 9 (264-368). Rin battles his way to victory.

Another ko fight follows 85: Rin never lets up. If I thought I were a little ahead, I would probably compromise by connecting at 86. However, going all-out like Rin is probably correct — in *byo-yomi* you can't count the score exactly and you'd really be left with regrets if you compromised and lost.

Concluded on page 41.

The 1991 Meijin League



If one player has dominated the Meijin tournament, it is Rin Kaiho: he has won the title eight times, played in 14 Meijin title matches, and either held the title or been a member of the league for 29 years in a row.

The 16th Meijin league in 1991 witnessed the second perfect score in the 31-year history of this tournament. The first came in 1973, in the 12th Yomiuri Meijin league, when Ishida Yoshio won all eight of his games. That year he challenged Rin Kaiho for the title in what turned out to be one of the most exciting title matches ever. Ishida took a three-game lead, but Rin made a miraculous comeback, winning the next four games and defending his title. This was the first time a player had ever recovered from a 0-3 deficit in a title match. It has been done twice since (by Cho against Fujisawa Shuko in the 7th Kisei title match in 1983 and by Rin against Cho in the 38th Honinbo title match, also in 1983), but in 20 years of following title matches in Japan the editor still rates the 1973 title match the most exciting he has witnessed.

Ironically Ishida did better in the title match when he did worse in the league. In 1974 he lost two games in the league and became the challenger only because his final-

round opponent, Shuko, blundered away a win in the endgame. This was the year that five players finished with a 5-3 score: Otake, Yamabe, Fujisawa Hosai, Hashimoto Utaro, and Shuko. Ishida went on to take the title 4-3 from Rin.

Two decades later, Rin is still a top player, and last year was his turn to win the league with a perfect slate. Unfortunately, that seems to put a jinx on the player's chances of winning the title match, but that doesn't alter the fact that it's a very impressive achievement. We would like to commemorate it by looking at some of Rin's best games from the league. Two very interesting games by Shuko are thrown in as a bonus.

Round 2: Rin v. Takemiya

Rin's target when he started out in this league was a modest one: simply to retain his place. Rin was being realistic: he had had a bad scare when he started out the previous year by losing three of his first four games, putting him in danger of losing his place in the league for the first time ever. Of course, he rallied and won three of his last four games to finish in 5th place. This time his first game (it came in the second round, as he was the odd man out in the first) was considered to be one of the key pairings of the league. Takemiya is a great player who always starts as one of the favourites in the Meijin league but who surprisingly has never become the challenger. (For the record, he has played in 11 Meijin leagues. He took second place to Rin in the 16th league with 6-2. He also came 2nd in the 15th league, again with 6-2.)

White: Takemiya Masaki Judan

Black: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 5 hours each.

Played on 10 January 1991.

Commentary by Awaji Shuzo 9-dan.

Figure 1 (1-30)

Rin goes for territory with 13 and 15, but later he commented that he should have played 13 at A.

White 16 is the first turning point. White could also take territory on the side by connecting at 19. Takemiya prefers centre thickness; he is satisfied when he gets sente to attack at 24.




Figure 1 (1-30)




Figure 2 (31-60)

Figure 2 (31-60)

Takemiya continues to build centre thickness. Rin's 39 is a cautious move. Black would like to extend at 40, but he is worried about White A, especially because White has sente moves on both sides in the corner.

White 40, a hane at the head of two stones, feels good, but White has to take gote in the centre with 46, so Black's strategy of securing a solid base with 39 seems reasonable. Of course,

Takemiya was also satisfied.

Black 47. Black can't waste any time reducing White's moyo.

Black 57 makes bad shape, but that can't be helped.

White 58 is the vital point, but 60 is perhaps dubious, as 58 ends up clinging to the back of a strong black position (in Figure 3). White 60 should simply be at 62; for his part, Rin said he was worried that White might scoop out his base by playing 60 at B.




Figure 3 (61-100)

95: ko

Figure 3 (61-100)

White 64 begins a forceful attack. Black pokes his head out up to 79, but his group is not yet settled.

White 80 is essential to forestall Black A, White B, Black 80. Black 81 is also essential: the game would be lost if White made an approach move one line below 81. With 82, it is White's turn to destroy territory.

Thanks to the stone Black gets in place at 93, White can't cut at C: Black D.






Figure 4 (101-150)
25: ko

Figure 4 (101-150)

White 10 has a decisive effect on the game. After starting a ko with 21, Rin plays a good move at 23. Black 29 sets up a squeeze, providing some insurance for this group, so Black can switch to the large move of 31. With 33 and 37, he takes a definite lead.

Takemiya: 'I overlooked the hane [23]. Playing 10 at 18 would have been better.'

Black 49. Better to capture 48 with a hane to its left.





Figure 5 (151-200)

Figure 5 (151-200)

Black 51 aims at A.

Black 61 is a big move. Without it, Black can't answer White 1 in *Dia. 1* at 2 because of White 3.

Black 75. Black misses a tesuji: wedging in at Black 86. (Please check the variations yourself.) Fortunately for Rin, he had a safe lead anyway.



Dia. 1




Figure 6 (201-249)

Figure 6 (201-249)

This was an encouraging start to the league for Rin. He may already have had the feeling that this was going to be different from the previous year.

Black wins by 2 1/2 points.

Round 3: Rin v. Fujisawa

White: Fujisawa Shuko

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played on 28 February 1991.

This game (played on the day that President Bush announced the ceasefire in Iraq) is just as eventful as the previous one and, for Rin, a much tougher struggle. His opponent, Fujisawa Shuko, Honorary Kisei, is now one of

the elder statesmen of the go world, but his play belies his years.





Figure 1 (1-30)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1-30)

The invasion of 16 is a recent innovation. It is known in Japan as 'the Heisei joseki', after the name of the current era, which began after the Emperor Showa's death in 1989. However, the continuation of 17 is extremely unusual.

Rin: 'Black 17 is a little risky. Usually Black blocks on top at 23, followed by White 17, Black A. It worked out OK, because White linked up with 20, but I wouldn't have liked being split into two as in *Dia. 1*. Even if Black attaches at 'a' instead of 2, White breaks out with 'b'.'

The game thus starts peacefully, but war clouds gather when White invades at 28.

There is some interesting manoeuvring behind 25 and 26. Black wants White to play 26 at 27; he will then lock up the corner with Black 30, building an ideal position: a solid

corner with extensions on both wings.

Shuko refuses to go along with this. When he jumps to 26, Black 30 is no longer a good move, as next White can cap at B, severely reducing the scale of Black's position. Moreover, if Black answers White B by defending at 29, White then extends to C, making him the one who has gained efficiency. Black 27 is therefore natural.





Figure 2 (31-60)



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (31-60)

White 32. White rejects the peaceful approach of *Dia. 2*. Creating cutting points in Black's shape up to 40 is more interesting.


When Black connects at 41, the continuation to 52 is inevitable. Black 47, for example, may look strange, but there is a good reason for it. Black doesn't have the ko threats to fight a ko. The ko, by the way, is not the usual one of 2 in *Dia. 3* (next page) at 'a'; instead White will play 2 and 4 on the edge. White has an absolute ko threat at 6, whereas Black has none. That means he would have to play 9 and

11, but this result is not quite satisfactory, as his territory at the top is open at the side.


Black's solution is to descend at 47, which is a clever move. If White answers with 1 in *Dia. 4*, a ko fight follows, won as before by White, but with the difference that Black walls off the top with 10.

Black 49. Black prefers to build centre thickness rather than save his corner stones. The result to 52 is similar to *Dia. 4*, but Black 53 captures the white stone more efficiently, in sente.

Black invades at 57 to maintain territorial balance.



Dia. 3
8: ko; 10: takes



Dia. 4
7: ko




Figure 3 (61-100)

Figure 3 (61-100)


White uses the clever combination of 66 and 68 to build a wall. Black can't resist.

Both sides are playing well. Rin: 'I thought the game was close. Black 75 is a point that was preying on my mind. If instead White pushes down at 75, deciding whether to


answer him or to switch elsewhere would be perplexing. Even so, Black should have made a shoulder hit at 82 or secured himself with Black A, White B, Black 77. He could then have aimed at harassing White's group to the right.'

White 76 is a superb move, a vintage Shuko move. Rin: 'This blow rocked me. I had facilely assumed there was nothing to be afraid of, what with the wall of steel Black had on the left side. But 76 hit me where it hurt.'

This is no time for pride: Black abjectly seeks life with 77 to 81. Only after patiently securing a base does he strike back with 83. He could live immediately with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*, but he doesn't want to help White to strengthen himself on the outside like this. White 4, threatening 'a', will be sente, so White seals off the centre. Playing like this would lose.



Dia. 5



Even if Black answers White C at D, then answers White 100 at E, White can still attack his eye shape with F.

Rin: 'I can't answer like that if the group can be killed later. If White pushed down with 1 in *Dia. 6*, I intended to live with 2 and 4. Black's shape is crushed flat, but that can't be helped. If 9 to 19 followed as in the game, Black would launch a fierce attack with 20 and 22. The game may still be tough for Black, but it would be a difficult fight for both sides.'




Figure 4 (101-150)

Figure 4 (101-150)

Black 3 transforms the game: this was the vital point for both sides. Black now leads.

Rin relates that he was astonished at how suddenly the game turned in his favour. Perhaps because of that, his endgame was slack. Instead of 15, Black should attack the white group (with 20 in *Dia. 6*).

Black is alive after 17.

Black 21 is unnecessary. Black should attack at 37. Black has A, aiming at wedging in at B, so it will be difficult for White to make eye shape.

Black 31 is also slack. Black should exchange C for White D, then block at 46.

Black 37 should be omitted: there's no reason to give White the ponnuki.

Figure 5 (151-200)

Rin made a number of dubious moves in this game, whereas Shuko made only one, but his sole blunder was decisive.

Figure 6 (201-249)

White 24 loses a point: it should be at 28.

Even though Shuko failed to follow through on his masterly play in the opening, this was still a very interesting game.

Black wins by 2 1/2 points.




Figure 5 (151-200)




Figure 6 (201-249)

Round 4: Rin v. Otake

Rin v. Otake has always been regarded as a heavyweight pairing. Born in the same year, 1942, these two have been the main stars of the Meijin tournament. Otake's record of 22 terms in the Meijin league or holding the title is second only to Rin's and is one ahead of

Shuko. This game features some very positive playing by Rin, with the emphasis on centre fighting.

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Otake Hideo 9-dan

Played on 14 March 1991.




Figure 1 (1-30)

Figure 1 (1-30)

Referring to moves like 10, 14, and 16, the Asahi newspaper commentary described Rin's opening as a 'swaggering fuseki'. Otake lets him have his way — instead of pushing along to the right with 17 and cutting, he answers peacefully. He then lets White build excellent thickness with the joseki from 22 to 32 in Figure 2.




Figure 2 (31-60)

Meijin Title Records

Most Meijin titles

1. Rin Kaiho: 8 (played in 14 title matches)
2. Cho Chikun: 5 (in a row: the record) (6); Kobayashi Koichi: 5 (6)
4. Otake: 4 (10)
5. Shuko: 2 (4); Sakata: 2 (6); Kato: 2 (3)
8. Takagawa: 1 (2); Ishida: 1 (4).

(Nine players have shared the 30 titles played to date.)

Most appearances in Meijin league (including terms as title holder)

1. Rin: 29
2. Otake: 22
3. Fujisawa Shuko: 21
4. Sakata Eio: 19
5. Cho Chikun: 16
6. Kato Masao, Fujisawa Hosai: 14
8. Kobayashi Koichi: 13
9. Takemiya Masaki: 11
10. Hashimoto Shoji, Ishida Yoshio, Takagawa Kaku: 10

Figure 2 (31-60)

White 40 is well-timed. Black 41 is dubious, as it lets White build good centre thickness with 42 to 46. Black should exchange A for White B, then jump out at Black 46.

White 48 is another good move. White 50 next is obstinate: it stops Black from settling his group by attaching at C.

Cutting with 56 to 60 is the natural follow-up to 50. Rin is playing very forcefully.




Figure 3 (61-100)


Figure 3 (61–100)

Black 61. If Black ataris (below 60 in Figure 2), White will cut at 61.


Having to exchange 65 for 66 is painful for Black, as is capturing the stone with 67. White's attack has succeeded.

White 72 and 74 are a clever answer to Black 71. White rips off a lot of profit up to 92.

Rin got all of this territory because of White's cautious move of 75. Otake commented later that out of fighting spirit he should have played 75 at 79. The players worked out the continuation in *Dia. 1*. Apparently this gives a close game.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Another possibility for 75 is extending at 1 in *Dia. 2*. Again White fails to secure as much territory as in the figure.

Black has been waiting for a chance to play 93. Rin counters with a standard *sabaki* sequence.

Figure 4 (101–150)

Black 13 is a dangerous attack. White just manages to save his bottom group up to 24.

Black 27 is another sharp move. After letting Rin dominate the first half of the game, Otake is starting to throw his weight around.

White has to pull back with 28, letting Black secure a stone at the bottom. This gain is not enough to upset White's lead, however.

Figure 5 (151–170)

White 52. The game is now close on the

board.

White's centre territory disappears when he lets Black play the successive moves of 51 and 67, but White's strong point here is that his three stones on the centre left side cannot be captured.




Figure 4 (101–150)





Figure 5 (151–170)

63: takes three stones



Dia. 3

Black 69. If Black tries to capture White

with 1 in *Dia. 3*, White can cut off and kill the centre group.

This was a game in which Rin demonstrated just how powerful a player he is. It is probably one of his best wins against Otake.

Black resigns after White 170.

Round 5: Rin v. Awaji

After defeating Otake in the 4th round and scoring his third straight win, Rin took sole possession of the lead. His closest rivals were Yoda, on 3-1, and Takemiya, on 2-1. Rin's opponent in his fourth game was Awaji Shuzo, a player whose fighting spirit and dogged tenacity have earned him the nickname of Rocky. Their clash lived up to expectations.

White: Awaji Shuzo 9-dan

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played on 18 April 1991.




Figure 1 (1-30)

Figure 1 (1-30)

Black 21 is a good move. White has to move out at a snail's pace.

The nature of the game is determined when Rin rejects the peaceful move of 27 at A.

Figure 2 (31-60)

White 34 is severe. Rin: 'I never dreamed White would ignore 33.' Black should have

used 33 to connect at 34.

Having to grovel for life with 37 is painful. Ishida Akira (the newspaper commentator): 'Rin's ability to play patiently when he has to shows how resilient he is.'

White 44 is dubious. White should first play at 48, that is, 1 in *Dia. 1*. If Black lives with 2, then White 3 next is the vital point. This result is superior to the figure, where White helps Black to build thickness with 45 and 47.

Black takes the vital point of 53, then attacks at 57.





Figure 2 (31-60)



Dia. 1

Figure 3 (61-100)

White 68 forestalls a black move one line above 70.

White 78 may be the losing move, according to Ishida. White is worried about the potential size of this corner, but, as it turns out, he has no reasonable continuation after Black 79. If, for example, he attaches at 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black makes a placement at the vital point of 2. The players examined the variations at length after the game but couldn't find any good con-

tinuation for White. If White played 3 and Black answered at 4, then White 5 and 7 would be troublesome, but Black has a better answer at 4 in *Dia. 3*.







Figure 3 (61-100)



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Better than 78 would be capping at 1 in *Dia. 4*. If Black 2, White can start a troublesome fight with 3 and 5. This would make use of the stones he has played at 68 and 70 in the figure.

White changes course with 80. Black launches a fierce counterattack with 81 and 83. Some very complicated fighting follows.





Figure 4 (101-150)



Dia. 5

Figure 4 (101-150)

White is aiming at the centre black group, but Black calmly grabs more profit with 9. He is confident he can handle the attack at 12.

Black 21 is a clever contact play. If White carelessly answers at 24, Black will cut off the pivotal stones with A. White can't stop Black from breaking out up to 27.

White manages to pull off something in the top left corner, but on the verge of living he deserts the group. The reason is shown in *Dia. 5*.

Dia. 5. If White lives with 1, Black 2 and 4 will be severe. White can force with 5 and 7, then switch to 9, but Black 10 will be sente. This way White would have no chance of winning. Awaji: 'Since way back I seem to have been one move behind in each fight.'



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


Figure 5 (151-200)
ko: 67, 70, 73, 76, 79

Figure 5 (151-200)

White's only chance is to take all the side and corner territory, but capturing Black 57 unconditionally is impossible.

A ko follows, but Black has any number of adjacent ko threats. Ishida: 'You can hardly call this a ko.'

When Black captures at 81, it's all over — 83 helps save the centre group.




Figure 6 (201-219)

Figure 6 (201-219)

Awaji is known for his middle-game power, but Rin had no trouble containing him.

White resigns after Black 219.

By coincidence, Rin's first four games in the Meijin league were his most interesting ones. We would therefore like to leave Rin, who finished off as he began with four straight wins, and have a look at a couple of very interesting Shuko games.

Round 7: Fujisawa v. Cho

Like his game against Rin, this is a Shuko masterpiece that didn't quite make it. However, it's still worth a look, as it was one of the highlights of the league.

White: Fujisawa Shuko 9-dan

Black: Cho Chikun Honinbo

Played on 11 July 1991.




Figure 1 (1-35)

Figure 1 (1-35)

Black 11 is an unusual joseki in professional play. Usually Black links up with 12, letting White cut at 11.

White 28. Why doesn't White enclose the bottom left corner with White 29? Shuko: 'White 29 is purely a matter of territory. Black's left-side group is solid, so if Black plays 29 White can be content just to live.'

Figure 2 (36-70)

White plays 36 and 38 to make use of his left-side thickness to attack.





Figure 2 (36-70)




Dia. 1

White 54. Shuko: 'White could capture a stone with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, but this is quite uninteresting after Black 2 and 4. Black 'a' is sente, so there is no way to split the black groups. The white wall to the left will come under attack.'

White achieves his goal of sealing Black in with 62. For his part, Black must resist with 63 on. Submissively linking up with 63 at A is the move of a loser.

The continuation is forced.



Dia. 2
7: connects

Figure 3 (71-100)

Cho was very unhappy at having to play

77. He muttered: 'What a pitiful go player I am.' Had he made a misreading? Shuko: 'Perhaps. Black 1 in *Dia. 2* is frightening, but my reading was that I could handle this with 2 to 6.' Black must connect at 7, but he loses the *semeai* after 14 by one move.




Figure 3 (71-100)
75: connects

In the end, Black is forced to link up with 85 anyway, so his counterattack has been parried. How is this result?

Shuko: 'Almost even, probably. White is thick overall, so I didn't think my position was bad, though. When we resumed the fuseki with 88 and 90, Black 91 surprised me and so did Black 97. Black should just defend by jumping to A. Even so, Black 97 is big.'

Both players agreed that White was slightly ahead. That's why Cho didn't feel like defending at A.

White 98 is severe. Black has no choice but to try to capture it unconditionally with 99 on.







Figure 4 (101-150)



Dia. 3

Figure 4 (101-150)

Black 9 is the only move. Black 1 in *Dia. 3* would be risky. A ko results to 14, which for Black is equivalent to collapse.

After 18, Black is one move ahead in the capturing race, so he can switch to 19. However, all of White's moves on the outside will be sente, so Black can't touch his bottom right corner. This looks like an easy win for White.


Black attacks the corner anyway with 27, as he has nothing to lose. His aim is to set up forcing moves on the outside.

Shuko had regrets about 38. 'Giving Black scope to fight on was unthinking. I should have played at 1 in *Dia. 4*. Even if Black pushes out with 2, White can catch him with 3 and 5. This way the game would be over.'


He had further regrets about 42. Instead, White can crawl at 1 in *Dia. 5*. After 3 and 5, the cut (43 in the figure) will not be sente.

Black secures a large territory up to 49.

White may still be ahead, but the game is no longer resignable for Black.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5




Figure 5 (151-200)

ko: 88, 91, 94; 96: connects (at 85)

100: ko (at 52)

Figure 5 (151-200)

White 82. Before starting the ko, White should exchange A for Black B. That would leave him with C for later.

Shuko looked full of confidence when he connected the ko with 96.

Figure 6 (201-237)

White 8. The game certainly looks like a win for White...

White 18 is one of Shuko's celebrated *poka* or blunders. In fact, his fellow professionals often say 'I did a Shuko' when they've made a stupid oversight. Black gets a *hanami* (flower-viewing) ko with 19, that is, one in which he has nothing at stake.

In the pressroom Ishida Yoshio commented: 'Terrible — on the verge of completing a masterpiece.'




Figure 6 (201–237)

ko: 6, 9, 12, 17, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 37

All White had to do was to play 18 at 20. That would have worked out as a 2 1/2-point win for him.

This was the second 'won' game that Shuko let slip in the league, but at least he kept his place by scoring 4–4. In the 17th league he took his revenge on Cho with a good win.

White resigns after Black 237.

To conclude, here is another game with some unusual fighting. This time Shuko manages to bring home the bacon, but it's touch-and-go.

Round 5: Fujisawa v. Takemiya

White: Takemiya Masaki Judan

Black: Fujisawa Shuko 9-dan

Played on 11 April 1991.

Commentary by Rin Kaiho Tengen.

Figure 1 (1–33)

Black 11. Black 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1* would also be good enough, but 11 is the instinctive fighting move.

White 18 is perhaps a new move — usually White automatically plays at 19, a hane at the head of two stones. After the game Shuko said: 'I was grateful. Isn't the hane the only move?' There was no response from Takemiya. Just for the record, the hane would probably lead to

the fight shown in *Dia. 2*.

Black's centre wall would seem to rule out a large-moyo game for Takemiya.

Rin criticized 26 for filling in one of White's own liberties. He advocated playing at 32 immediately.

Shuko boldly invades at 33, which looks like a textbook example of the vital point.






Figure 1 (1–33)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2






Figure 2 (34-65)


Figure 2 (34-65)

White has to compromise with 34. He would like to resist with A, but Black has an excellent follow-up at B. In retrospect, it might have been wiser to play 32 in Figure 1 one space to the left.


Black cuts the top area down to almost nothing, giving him a good start. The only consolation for White is that he gets sente to resume the fuseki with 40. He's not out of the game yet.

Black 47 is a good forcing move. Black can now tenuki — if White 1 in *Dia. 3*, the marked stone protects his cutting point.

Black 51 forestalls White 53. Black C is the usual follow-up to 49, but Black is going all-out, trying to play on both sides.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

White 64. White 65 is the safe move, but professionals hate having the opponent dictate to them. (If White 65, Black will defend at 64.)

One stubborn move like 64 can lead the game into a completely unexpected direction.




Figure 3 (66-100)

Figure 3 (66-100)

The drawback of White's corner *tenuki* is that he can't resist Black 69. If he intercepts with 1 in *Dia. 4*, he falls into a trap. Black's stones combine beautifully up to 8. If White connects solidly with 5 one space to the right, he loses the capturing race.

Content with his forcing moves, Black switches to attack with 71.

Takemiya now shows his skill at *sabaki* (settling a group under attack) and gets back into the game. White 72 and 74 are just right. He not only looks after his group but also seals Black off from the centre.


Black has to cut at 87, as White A would threaten his group. The result is *too good* for White.

Rin: 'I wonder about Black 75. What if Black turns solidly at 1 in *Dia. 5* instead? If White 2, Black 3 and 5 — in the continuation to 9 he gets more territory than in the game, and White is left with a weak point at 'a'. This is how Black should have played.'


When Takemiya switches to 98, he has made up for his bad start and is well in the game.

The only problem is that White 100 is slack. Takemiya: 'Should I have made a hane above 99 instead of 100? Actually I was feeling a little optimistic...'


Shuko: 'Right. That would have made it tough for Black, I thought. White 100 was probably dubious.'



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 6. If White 1, the moves to 5 are inevitable. Black can't push down at 6 next, as the continuation to 13 is indisputably good for White (note that Black can't play 10 at 11, as he won't have time to connect at 10). That means that Black has to use 6 to block at 'a', letting White play 'b'. This result is better for White than that in the game.




Figure 4 (101-150)
46: ko (at 6)

Figure 4 (101-150)

White 2. Surely enclosing the centre with White 5 is the move you'd expect from Takemiya. Rin: 'In that case, Black will block at 8, and White can play 10, giving a close game.'

Black 9 is a very tight territorial move. Black is not afraid of the ko in Dia. 7, as he has plenty of ko threats.

In a sense, the game has entered the endgame, but there are so many open places it's hard to know where to play. Note that the centre has been transformed into a wasteland by Black 5.

White has one eye on the top right all the time, but can't bring himself to start the ko. In the end, Black gets to connect at 29.

White 30 is slack: White should menace the centre group with White 33. Black will probably turn at A, to forestall White B, so White could then switch to 30.

'Black 31 and 33 were good moves,' Takemiya admitted after the game. In contrast to White 33, Black gets territory here; more important, he secures eye shape. White 30 may be the losing move.





Figure 5 (151-200)



Dia. 8

Figure 5 (151-200)

Black 79 is about the only slip made by either side in the endgame. Black should force first with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8; the atari of 'a' later will gain him two points.




Figure 6 (201-254)

14: ko (the marked stone); 16: connects (at 11).
White wins and connects the final ko.

Figure 6 (201-254)

Up to 71 in Figure 3, Shuko dictated the pace, then Takemiya took over, until betrayed by his optimistic nature. However, the mistakes by both sides were not major ones and do not detract from the merit of this game.

Black wins by 1/2 point.

(Translated by John Power)

This concludes our coverage of the 1991 Meijin league. In our next issue, we will look at what turned out to be a memorable title match.

Takemiya Wins 3rd TV Asian Championship

If we agree to set aside the Japan-China Super Go series, then we can say that Takemiya Masaki has shown superb consistency in international tournaments. First, he won the first two Fujitsu Cups, then last year he topped that by winning, for the third time in a row, the TV Asian Championship.

This title is a mini-championship for the top two place-getters in Japan's NHK Cup, China's CCTV Cup, and Korea's KBS King of Go Championship, plus the previous winner (seeded into the 2nd round). This time it was the turn of Seoul to act as host. The tournament was held from 27-30 August.

In the first round, Cao Dayuan 9-dan (China) defeated O Meien 8-dan (2nd in NHK Cup), Suh Nung-ook 9-dan (Korea) defeated Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (China), and Yoda Norimoto 8-dan (NHK winner) defeated Cho Hun-hyun 9-dan (Korea). In the second round, Takemiya beat Yoda and Cao beat Suh. Below is the final.

White: Cao Dayuan (China)

Black: Takemiya Masaki (Japan)

30 seconds per move, plus ten minutes each (to be used in 1-minute units at any time).

Played in Seoul on 30 August 1991.

Figure 1 (1-50)

Based 23, based almost solely on intuition, is an interesting move — if White A, Black will push along at B. There was no way to know now, but later 23 played a decisive role in the game.




Figure 1 (1-50)


Black 33 is another instinctive move. In the fight that follows, both players seem to be relying on intuition more than on analysis.

White has a good reason for not answering 39 directly. If White 1 in Dia. 1, Black will use a

sacrifice to cut off White's two centre stones.

White 46 is dubious: safer would be White C.

Black 47 is careless: correct is Black 49.



Dia. 1




Figure 2 (51-100)

88: ko; 91: ko; 93: connects

Figure 2 (51-100)

White 52 is an overplay: capturing with a *geta* at 55 would give White a perfectly good position (Black A, White B, Black C might follow).

White 62 should be at 1 in *Dia. 2*. The centre white group is immobilized after 10, but this is still better than the game.

White 68 leads to a perilous fight in the centre.

Cao desperately tries to fight his way out with 96, but...

Figure 3 (101-129)

The stone Black played at 23 in Figure 1 turns out to be in exactly the right place.

White resigns after Black 129.





Figure 3 (101-129)

23: connects (at 6)



Dia. 2

16th Gosei Title

Game One

For the second year in a row, the Gosei title saw a clash between the two Kobayashis: Koichi and Satoru. The latter started off no better than the year before, losing the first two games, but then he threw a scare into Koichi by winning the next two. For the first time since he won this title in 1988, Koichi was forced to go the full distance. (He took the title 3-0 from Kato, then defended it 3-1 against Imamura in 1989 and 3-0 against Satoru in 1990.)

White: Kobayashi Koichi Gosei
 Black: Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan
 Played on 11 July 1991.
 Commentary by O Rissei 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-39)

Figure 1 (1-39)

Black 35 was queried after the game, it being suggested that A was the only move. White B and Black C follow. However, Black 35, aiming at D, is big, so I don't think it's a problem.




Figure 2 (40-100)

Figure 2 (40-100)

White 40, 42, and 48 are skilful moves. White settles his group in sente.

Black 87. Perhaps Black should play 88 and

fight the ko with White 87, Black A.




Figure 3 (101-160)

ko: 5, 8, 31, 34;

ko (right of 42): 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60

Figure 3 (101-160)

Black scores a success with 17 (White can't resist strongly because of his weak group on the centre left), but White strikes back with 28, which leads to a ko.

Black 37. Black could live with Black 40, White A, Black B, but he loses on territory after White C.




Figure 4 (161-270)

66: left of 63; 69: at 63; 71: connects (right of 65);

ko (over 63): 72, 75, 78, 81, 84; 128: at 122;

169: connects (right of 93); 170: connects (at 125)

Figure 4 (161-270)


White wins by 7 1/2 points.

The Myriad Techniques of Go (3)


Sato Masaharu 9-dan

In this instalment we switch from techniques for capturing stones to various techniques for linking up endangered stones. In general, the link or watari


will be effected on the 1st or 2nd line, but you should approach these problems without preconceptions.




1. The black stones seem a little too widely separated, but White's own shape is not perfect.




2. How can Black link up his three stones? Again he must exploit the defects in White's shape.




3. In actual play you might just give up, but the three black stones can be saved. White has a defect at A.



4. White has just played the marked stone. If Black A, he dies after White B, but can Black link up if he plays C instead? Make sure you look at White's strongest counter:



5. White is alive in the corner, but Black can't make two eyes. That means his only chance is to link up with the stones above.



6. White only has one eye, but after he plays the marked stone, Black seems to be the one in trouble. How can Black link up?

Answers on page 46.

Continued from page 21

Another trade follows with 126 and 127, but the profit-loss balance is pretty even. Consequently, it doesn't affect the score.

I couldn't understand why the players kept fighting the ko at 150, seeing that each side connects a ko at 150 and 166, but I remembered that they were playing under the Chinese rules. Apparently their play was the best under the Chinese rules.

This is a game in which Rin showed his legendary tenacity of old.

Black wins by 2 1/2 points.


(Kido, August 1991. Translated by John Power)

Efficiency (4)

Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Good and Bad Approach Moves

In this instalment I would like to look at the role of approach moves or *kakari* in the fuseki. Naturally enough, the merits of a particular approach move will vary depending on the overall position. I hope to be able to show you some of the criteria for evaluating approach moves.



Dia. 1: Black's approach move?

Dia. 1. A similar position to this was given in our first instalment (GW63, Dia. 14). Where should Black play next? To narrow the choice down a little, please choose from among 'a' to 'd'.

I showed this position to ten amateurs, ranging from 5-kyu to 1-kyu. They all assumed it must be a very difficult problem, so they all gave it deep thought, but there was no need to be so suspicious. Actually none of these moves is bad. If the correct answer is worth 100 points, then even the worst move here would score 80. I received five different answers:

'a': three persons

'b': two

'c': two

'd': two


give up: one.

The player who gave up can be praised for his honesty, but I would have liked to hear where he would have played all the same.

None of the other nine seemed to have much confidence in his choice.

How about the reader? I'm sure you realized that the key to the position is the joseki that has been played on the bottom left.

What is an efficient approach move?



Dia. 2: a standard sequence


Dia. 2. Black 1 was the most popular answer. If you cut the board in half and just considered the right half, 1 might be the right answer. Responding with 2 and 4 looks right. Both sides could then make extensions with 5 and 6. This kind of sequence is often seen in professional games.

However, I can't recognize 1 as the correct answer. Because it doesn't take into account the whole board. Perhaps I'd give it 95 points.


Dia. 3. How about Black 1? Unfortunately, this is a step down; let's rate it at 85 points. Assuming White 2 and 4, Black 'a' next will be too flat, so Black will probably try to expand the bottom area with 5. Does this moyo seem impressive? If it does, it's a hallucination. No matter how much Black expands on the right and in the centre, his moyo will be drastically reduced when White jumps in at 'b'. On the other hand, Black won't want to block at 'c' at an early stage of the game because it's an endgame move.

I hope you will realize that enclosing an

area that's open at the side is inefficient. That means that Black 1 is an inefficient move, because its aim is to enclose the lower side. Looking at it from White's point of view, his marked stone ends up in a good position, and he can switch to 6, the last really large point of the fuseki, so this is an ideal development for him.



Dia. 3: the bottom area is open at the side




Dia. 4: thickness goes to waste

Dia. 4. When I asked the players who chose 1 the reason, they said they 'just had a feeling'. The interesting thing about the fuseki is that if you 'just make an approach move', it will rarely be a bad move, but of course this move scores even lower. Maybe about 80 points. The moves to 5 can be expected. Black has 'made' White play a move, 2, that he wanted to play anyway, and his thickness below has gone to waste — these are the reasons why points are deducted for 1. Next, White will extend to 'a'


(a good, tight move) or to 'b' (always a good point) or take up position with 'c' (getting to be big by now), giving White a satisfactory fuseki.

That means that —



Dia. 5: full marks for efficiency

Dia. 5. The approach move of 1 scores 100 points. If the ordinary joseki to 5 follows, it's self-evident that the result is better for Black than Dia. 4. In contrast to Dia. 3, Black's position is not open at the side, so he can enclose territory efficiently.




Dia. 6: tenuki

Dia. 6. Black could also just make the approach move, then *tenuki*, switching to 3. His thickness at the bottom left is so imposing that it's unthinkable that his solitary stone at 1 will be attacked.

Another possibility is to jump to 'a' instead of 3: building a moyo in depth like this on the

left side is a good strategy. In short, if Black doesn't miss the key point of 1, he can't go wrong.




Dia. 7: unreasonable

Dia. 7. Black's left side looks like becoming big when he plays 1, so White may be tempted to come in at 2. One sometimes sees people play like this, but this is blatant envy. White immediately finds himself in a tough position when Black attacks with 3 and 5. Even if he saves his stone, he won't gain anything.

Dia. 1 may have been a little difficult. Let's look at an easier example.


Approach on the wider side



Dia. 8: a superb formation


Dia. 8. In a position like this, most people will play at 1. After 2, Black stakes out a magnificent position with 3. Some people might

think that White will answer 1 with a pincer at 'a' or 3 and for this reason might simply prefer to extend to 'a' instead of 1. This is also an orthodox approach. Black 'a' is also a correct move besides 1. However, there are people who are more cross-grained.



Dia. 9: the narrow side


Dia. 9. There are plenty of people who will go out of their way to make things tough for themselves by playing on the narrower side at 1. Perhaps it's because White's position at the top looks big to them. Again, this is nothing but envy. The result to 6 is hopeless for Black. Compare his position to the three-stone white position to his right: Black is cramped, whereas White has slid along the second line, giving him more breathing space. In this respect, note that White 2 at 4 would be a little slack: it would permit Black 'a', White 'b', Black 5.



Dia. 10: which approach move?

Dia. 10. How about this position? Which approach move should Black play in the bottom right corner?

with 'c', Black continues the attack with 'd', putting White on the ropes. In view of Black's strength at the bottom, White 2 and 4 may be overplays.




Dia. 11: conventional

Dia. 11. The conventional idea is to make an approach move on the wider side, at 1. There seems to be nothing wrong with the sequence to 5. Black plays at 5 rather than 'a' to make balance on the right side.


However, I assess this result as very unsatisfactory for Black. At the outset the marked white stone was not very strong, but the addition of 2 and 4 greatly strengthen it, and it is now in a nice position. To put it another way, the marked black stone is not serving an attacking role. When White takes the last large fuseki point with 6, I believe he has a slight lead.

Proverbs and rules always have exceptions. The surrounding position may cause the principle of making an approach move on the wider side to lose its validity.

Dia. 12. Black makes an approach move on the narrow side at 1. This is a violent move; it's different from the enviousness shown in Dia. 9. Black aims to make use of the marked black stone to attack the marked white stone. Usually Black gets a cramped position after White 2 and 4, but here it's White who becomes cramped when Black caps at 5. All the black stones at the bottom work efficiently, and suddenly White finds himself faced with a tough fight. If he tries to move out with White 'a', Black blocks his way with 'b'. If he moves out




Dia. 12: an overwhelming offensive



Dia. 13: answering peacefully

Dia. 13. Swallowing his pride and answering peacefully at 2 may be better for White. In this case, Black 3 and 5 are good, calm moves. They secure Black's own base and rob White of his. If White moves out with 6, Black prepares to attack with 7. White has no immediate prospects of settling this group, so Black will keep the initiative.

White is in trouble whether he follows Dia. 12 or 13: the approach move on the narrow side proved to be surprisingly severe.



Dia. 14: an even result

Dia. 14. Giving all my support to Black is not fair. Let's look at the position from White's point of view. It looks weak-spirited but preempting the attack with 2 may be best. Various continuations are conceivable for Black. One interesting possibility is the double approach move of 3. If the moves to 14 follow, White builds an excellent position, so Black's attack fizzles out. However, he is satisfied with his profit. The way to look at it is that Black's positive approach move at 1 produced the profit on the right.


As you can see, the approach move is by no means an easy subject. I hope I have given you some ideas to think about in your own games.

(*Let's Go*, April 1988)


The Myriad Shapes of Go: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the first move to look at — and reject. White counters with the standard tesuji of 2 and 4.



Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: the tesuji

Dia. 2. Attacking the defect in White's shape with 1 shows skilful technique. If White 'a', Black cuts at 'b' and wins the capturing race.


Dia. 3. If White 2, the atari of Black 3 works nicely. Black is connected.

Dia. 4. If White backtracks with 2, Black

plays 3. Attaching at 4 doesn't work, as Black 7 becomes an atari. Black 1 seizes the key point.



Dia. 3: connected



Dia. 4: connected

Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the least effective move. There's no continuation after White 2. Black 'a' instead of 1 is likewise refuted by White 2.

Dia. 2. The tesuji is attaching at 1, leaving open the two sente moves of 'a' and 'b'.


Dia. 3. If White 2, Black 3 is sente; Black 5 then creates two cutting points.

Dia. 4. White 2 leads to a similar result: Black 5 creates two cutting points. Carelessly playing 5 at 'a' would let White get a ko with 'b'.


only works if White answers at 2. If White tries to cut the connection, the same *oi-otoshi* tesuji appears, but —




Dia. 1: resourceless




Dia. 2: the tesuji




Dia. 1: hasten slowly




Dia. 2: success




Dia. 3: two cutting points



Dia. 4: likewise




Dia. 3: a fake tesuji




Dia. 4: failure

Dia. 5. White might counter with 2. That gives him the atari of 4, but Black 7 sets up an *oi-otoshi* capture after 9.

Dia. 4. White has a better counter at 2. The hane of 6 stops Black from getting even a ko.



Dia. 5: oi-otoshi




Dia. 6: double ko


Dia. 6. White might try to set up a ko with 2 and 4, but Black has the calm answer of 7. After 9 there is a double ko and an *oi-otoshi*, so White can't escape.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. For better or for worse, Black has to play at 1. The problem is what happens after White 2 and 4. Black seems to be handicapped by shortage of liberties...



Dia. 1: in trouble?



Dia. 2: tesuji

Dia. 2. The *kosumi* of 2 is an effective move. If 3, Black sacrifices two irrelevant stones and rescues the main body of his corner group. If White 'a', Black recaptures. White 3 at 'b' doesn't do anything: Black 4. If Black 2 at 4, White ataris from the corner — 2 is the only move.


Dia. 3 (next page). Attacking at 1 is a tricky move. If Black 2, he falls into a trap: he is captured after 3 and 5.

Answer to Problem 3


Dia. 1. Attacking from a distance with 1 is a good move. Hasten slowly, as the proverb goes. An indirect attack has the surprising effect of leading the opponent into shortage of liberties.

Dia. 2. White will play 2 if he wants to stop Black from linking up, but Black simply crawls at 3, forcing White to fill in his own liberties. He then gets an *oi-otoshi* after 7 and 9. It's surprisingly simple.

Dia. 3. Black 1 may look like a tesuji, but it




Dia. 3: trapped




Dia. 4: dead

Dia. 4. If Black 2, White 3 is troublesome. When Black takes the ko after 7, White plays 'a' and catches Black.

Dia. 5. Black should simply connect at 2: this is a good, calm answer. Next —



Dia. 5: the calm answer




Dia. 6: connected


Dia. 6. Even if White plays 3, he can't enter at 'a' after 4. If instead White plays 3 at 'a', Black simply ataris at 3. Black 2 may be hard to find, but it is very effective.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Black 1 is probably the first move to strike the eye, but it has no follow-up whatsoever when White plays solidly at 2.




Dia. 1: goes nowhere




Dia. 2: also fails

Dia. 2. The contact play of 1 is often a tesuji, but it also leads nowhere when White solidly connects at 2. This is the vital point for White, but it is obviously useless for Black to play there.

Dia. 3. When in trouble try something dramatic — like the wedge at 1. This puts pressure on White.




Dia. 3: the wedge tesuji




Dia. 4: too good

Dia. 4. White 2 is bad, giving Black two cutting points after 3. He will save his stones and take profit into the bargain.

Dia. 5. Consequently, White will atari at 2. Black can then save his stones with the 3-5 combination. Note how effective 5 is compared to 1 in Dia. 2.



Dia. 5: correct




Dia. 6: connected

Dia. 6. White cannot cut Black with an atari at 1 or at 2. The sacrifice of a stone has been well worth it.


Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. Cutting directly with 1 and 3 leads to failure: White wins the capturing race after 4. This 4 is a basic tesuji you should know.




Dia. 1: failure

Dia. 2. Attaching at 1 doesn't work either. The result is similar to Dia. 1. If Black plays 1 at 3, White 4 again wins.



Dia. 2: Black loses



Dia. 3: playing from a distance

Dia. 3. Dropping back to 1 is a superb tesuji: the four black stones are saved. If White 'a' or 'b', Black links up with 'c'.


Dia. 4. Before playing at 2 was a tesuji, but this time Black has an extra liberty, so he is safe after 3.

Dia. 5. If White intercepts at 2, Black cuts him off with 3 and 5. Note the value of the 1-2


exchange: White can't atari Black as in Dia. 1. White can now get a 'seki' by playing at 'a', but the seki collapses when Black captures the white group on the other side.

Black 1 is a superb tesuji. It is given in the Chinese life-and-death classic *Gengen Gokyo* (The Mysterious Sutra of Go).

(Igo Club, March 1991)



Dia. 4: no snapback



Dia. 5: a classic problem

Go World News

Continued from page 6

the challenger three times in a row. Usually a player strong enough to do this is also strong enough to take the title — will it be third time lucky for him this year? So far he has been foiled by Cho Chikun, who, by coincidence, also stood in the way of the only other player to challenge for a title three times in a row. That was Otake Hideo in the Meijin title from 1982 to 1984.

After the halfway point in the league, Kobayashi's only rival was the ex-Chinese, ex-Hong Kong player Chan Ka Yui 7-dan, who made a brilliant debut in the league, sharing the lead for the first five rounds. After beating players of the calibre of Rin, Kato, and Otake, he stumbled in the 6th round, losing to Komatsu. That still left him with a chance of forcing a playoff with Kobayashi, but the latter gave him no chance in their final-round game, played on 9 April.

Kobayashi swept the first three games of

the title match, and it seemed that the title was finally within his grasp. Will Cho, who is famous for his tenacity when his back is up against the wall, be able to fight back yet again?

Kobayashi's best-of-seven record

By becoming Honinbo challenger, Kobayashi has extended another impressive record: by spring next year he will have played in 11 best-of-seven title matches in a row. That's almost double the previous record of six in a row set by Cho and shows how Kobayashi is dominating the tournament scene. It's also a tribute to his stamina.

News from China


Nie Wins Ten Strongest Players Title

The Swiss system is used in many of the Chinese titles, but occasionally they indulge in the same liking for complicated tournament

(Continued on page 64.)


Twenty 2nd-Line Tesujis

The 2nd line is dismissed as 'the line of defeat' by the go proverb, but on closer examination it turns out to be a treasure house of tesujis. Moves on the 2nd line can be surprisingly effective both in attack and in defence. To demonstrate this, we would like to present the following compilation of 20 2nd-line tesujis. Familiarity with these tesujis should prove of immediate benefit in your games. (This article can be viewed as a sequel to the one in GW50 entitled 'The Second Line: When to Play on It, When to Leave It Alone'.)




Example

Just to get you in the mood, here is a famous 2nd-line connection tesuji. Black cannot sever White after 1. If Black A, White B; if Black C, White D. If White plays 1 at C, Black uses the cut of A to stop him from linking his corner group to the outside stone. Please explore the variations by yourself.




Problem 1. Find a better move for 1.

Black's play here is terrible: it's the essence of bad style. Black is just helping White to build up his position. What is the correct move for Black 1? (The problem will be easy for anyone who has read GW60.)




Problem 2. Black to play

White has just peeped with the marked stone. How can Black defend his cutting point in sente?




Problem 3. Find a better move for 1.

Black 1 is an *aji-keshi* move, that is, one that reduces the options of the person who plays it. Black is of course aiming at wedging in at 'a', but he has a much better way of attacking here.




Problem 4. Black to play

Black wants to save his three stones on the bottom right. What is the vital point?




Problem 5. Black to play

There is a standard technique for attacking White in this kind of position. What is the vital point?




Problem 6. Black to play

Find the vital point for attacking the white group if Black is to take maximum profit from the *aji* of his three captured stones.




Problem 7. Black to play

How can Black look after his two stones on the bottom left? What is the best way of pulling them out if Black decides not to sacrifice them?




Problem 8. Black to play

Black has a very effective tesuji for attacking the white group at the bottom. In a game you might be satisfied with sente endgame moves that let the group live, but if you take a closer look...




Problem 9. Black to play

There are various ways of attacking the white group at the bottom, but one of them is particularly effective.




Problem 10. Black to play

Taking into consideration the presence of the marked stone, what is the best way to answer White 1?




Problem 11. Black to play

The pillar of black stones has no eyes, but Black can live by exploiting the weaknesses in White's shape.




Problem 12. Black to play

The marked white stone is an overplay: it should be at 'a'. How does Black punish White?




Problem 13. Black to play

White seems to be linked up: if Black 'a', White 'b', and vice versa. But there is a pitfall. Can you find it?




Problem 14. Black to play

Can Black play 'a'? Some tesujis are involved, but you should be able to read it out.




Problem 15. Black to play

What is the best way for Black to look after his solitary stone at the centre bottom?




Problem 16. Black to play
Can you rescue the group on the right?




Twenty 2nd-Line Tesujis: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. An easy problem to start with: Black makes a two-step hane at 1. This move is obvious when you know it, but all the same it's a *tesuji*. The effect is to isolate the marked white stone — quite a contrast to the problem diagram.



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: can't resist

Dia. 2. Throwing in a cut at 2 doesn't help White. Whatever happens, he must connect at 4, so Black isolates the cutting stone as well with 5. The marked stone is hurting more than in Dia. 1, and the other three stones are floating helplessly. If White plays 6 at 'a', then he can link up with Black 6, White 'b', but this is paltry.


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. Black has to be careful how he answers, because he doesn't have much eye shape. Simply connecting at 1 shows a complete lack of ingenuity. White will play 2 in sente, then attack in the centre with 4. Black won't die, but he will be harassed.

Dia. 2. Black 1 is the *tesuji* for taking sente. If White wants to stop Black from making eye shape, he has to play 2 to 6, but Black gets sente to move out into the centre with 7. The sacrifice of a stone earns him a far superior result to Dia. 1.




Dia. 1: feeble




Dia. 2: gaining a tempo

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. First, Black plays 1, forcing White 2, then he plays the basic *tesuji* of 3, cutting across the knight's move. The continuation is simple; up to 9, Black cuts off a string of stones.



Dia. 1: success




Dia. 2: can't connect

Dia. 2. Even if White answers at 2, Black 3 makes it impossible for him to link up. Black 5


is a good move, preventing White from playing in at 'a'. If White plays 4 at 'a', the sequence reverts to Dia. 1.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. It should be obvious at a glance that the placement of 1 is the vital point. If you can discover this one move, the problem is virtually solved. If White 2, Black captures two stones with 3 and saves his cut-off stones. Instead of 2 —




Dia. 1: success



Dia. 2: even better

Dia. 2. If White resists with 2, filling in a liberty with 3 is the key. Black wins the capturing race by one move. If Black facilely plays 3 at 5, he loses the capturing race.




Dia. 3: wrong


Dia. 3. Being in a hurry to play the atari of 1 is bad style. Black loses the fight after 6.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. Pushing down at 1 shows that Black is not even thinking about the problem.




Dia. 1: no imagination



Dia. 2: better, but...

Dia. 2. Black 1 may be a little better, but it also leads nowhere. White 2 at 'a' would invite a sharp counterattack in the form of Black 2.



Dia. 3: the 'corner' tesuji


Dia. 3. Attacking at the 'corner' (*kado*) of the white group with 1 is the tesuji. This move is a sacrifice, but it is extremely effective. In order to live, White is forced to play 2 on, helping Black to build superb outside influence. The marked white stone is also greatly weakened. Unfortunately for White, this is his only answer to Black 1.

Answer to Problem 6


Dia. 1. The 1-3 combination is not good style. Black 3 is the vital point, but 1 is superfluous.

Dia. 2. Playing immediately at 1 is best. White can't answer at 2, as Black has the threat of 3 and 5. This is a disaster for White. Instead of 2 —


Dia. 3. He must answer docilely at 2. Black can then seal him in with 3. Note how much better the shape 1 and 3 make is than the shape in Dia. 1. If White omits 4, Black will play 'a' and win the capturing race.



Dia. 1: bad style




Dia. 2: White goes wrong



Dia. 3: excellent shape


Answer to Problem 7

Dia. 1. Black 1 is certainly the weak point in White's shape, but White will simply push through with 2 and 4, and the result is not interesting for Black. There is a more stylish move.




Dia. 1: not enough

Dia. 2. In this position Black 1 is an interesting move. If White defends the corner with 2, Black 3 now works much better. If White 'a', Black 'b', and White can no longer capture the stones to the left.



Dia. 2: success




Dia. 3: White can't resist


Dia. 3. If White plays 2 to stop Black from escaping into the centre, Black counters with 3 and 5, making *miai* of 'a' and 'b'. Note that Black 5 is correct shape. Please confirm for yourself that when Black plays 'a', White cannot push up to the left of 'a'.

Answer to Problem 8

Dia. 1. Black might decide to seal White in with 1 to 5. If you feel that letting White live so easily is slack, then you have to find a way to attack his eye shape.




Dia. 1: not enough



Dia. 2: the placement tesuji

Dia. 2. The placement of 1 is a strong move. If 2, Black links up with 3 and is satisfied with

having gouged out his base. This drives White out into the centre, so Black can continue his attack. Playing Black 1 at 'a' would be too commonplace.




Dia. 3: destroying White's base


Dia. 3. If White answers at 2, Black has the follow-up tesuji of 3. Once again he gouges out White's base. White 4 at 5 would let Black cut at 4: Black wins the capturing race.

Answer to Problem 9

Dia. 1. The placement of 1 is an interesting move in this position. It works together with the marked black stone. If White 2, Black is satisfied with gouging out his base with 3 and 5. He can aim at continuing his attack with the peep of 'a'.



Dia. 1: good for Black




Dia. 2: an effective squeeze

Dia. 2. If White resists with 2, Black sacrifices two stones in return for an excellent


squeeze. That makes White overconcentrated and automatically solidifies Black's moyo.

Answer to Problem 10

Dia. 1. The presence of the marked stone makes answering White 1 difficult. If Black plays 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', then he has no answer to White 'd'.




Dia. 1: problems



Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. Black should hane at 1, then crawl at 3. After Black 5, his group is completely settled. Instead of 4 —




Dia. 3: caution called for


Dia. 3. If White extends at 1, Black has to be careful. Usually 1 is out of the question, but does the marked stone make a difference? Only if Black lets it: descending at 6 wins the capturing race. If instead he made a hane at 'a', White would throw in at 6 and get a ko. This problem is a good reading exercise. If you worked out Dia. 3 for yourself, you are of dan level.

Answer to Problem 11

Dia. 1. Black 1 is hopeless: no further comment is necessary.




Dia. 1: worst



Dia. 2: effective cuts

Dia. 2. Making two cuts, at 1 and 3, is the key to the solution. This is a tesuji with a wide range of applications, especially in the endgame. If White 'a' after 5, Black gets a big ko with 'b'.




Dia. 3: a chance of living


Dia. 3. Capturing at 1 is more prudent. Black 2 sets up a ko. It may be a two-stage ko — Black has to win the ko at 'a', then if White defends at 'b', take the ko again, force White 'c', then connect himself — but at least he now has a chance of living.

Answer to Problem 12

Dia. 1. An easygoing player might docilely block at 1. White keeps sente and moves out with 4. He should be satisfied: he has taken unearned profit.



Dia. 1: unearned profit




Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 2. The instant White makes the hane (the marked stone), Black should throw in a cut at 1. White must connect at 2 or else the marked stone will be captured. Black then plays 3 and 5. The difference is that White can no longer move out with 'a', as Black can wedge in at 'b'. White will next play 'b' or 'c', either of which is quite inferior to Dia. 1.

Answer to Problem 13


Dia. 1. The atari of 1 is a clever move. If White 2, Black keeps the white stones separated with 3 and 5.




Dia. 1: success
4: connects

Dia. 2. If instead White 2, Black still keeps White separated with 3 and 5. White cannot get a good result once Black discovers the tesuji of 1.

This is another tesuji with a wide range of applications.




Dia. 2: success




Dia. 1: crude

Answer to Problem 14

Dia. 1. Black should resolutely crawl along the second line. There is no need to fear White 8, as Black 9 stops him from increasing his liberties. The capturing race is an easy win for Black after 13.



Dia. 1: Black wins



Dia. 2: Black wins


8: at 2

Dia. 2. If White blocks at 1 instead of 6 in *Dia. 1*, Black uses the familiar sacrifice sequence from 2 on. This is known as the 'stone tower' squeeze (*sekito-shibori*). Black wins the fight by one move.


Answer to Problem 15

Dia. 1. Before fleeing into the centre, Black makes a peep at 1. The idea is not wrong, but this peep is too crude.

Dia. 2. Peeping on the 2nd line is much better. A stone at 1 works much more effectively than one clinging to the white wall at 'a'. The difference of one line is not to be slighted.



Dia. 2: a more useful peep




Dia. 3: satisfactory

Dia. 3. If White answers at 2, Black extends inside with 3. The sequence that follows is just one variation, but Black should be able to handle any fight that arises. Black is satisfied with the result to 13 here. If White plays 4 at 11, Black hanes at 5.


Answer to Problem 16

Dia. 1. Black wrests four stones from White's grasp with the 1-3 combination.




Dia. 1: the wedge tesuji

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black links up with 3. This way White can save his four stones and live, but Black is quite satisfied with linking up in sente.



Dia. 2: connected




Dia. 3: the wrong tesuji

Dia. 3. Starting out with 1 is sometimes a tesuji. It does enable Black to link up, but it is not recommended, as Black ends in gote. If White plays 2 at 4, Black links up with 5, White 3, Black 7.

Answer to Problem 17

Dia. 1. Each side has four liberties, so attacking with a move like 1, which doesn't reduce White's liberties, will obviously lose the capturing race. Black 1 at 'a' also loses: White simply descends at 'a'. The conclusion seems to be that 2 is the vital point.




Dia. 1: Black loses


Dia. 2. Black 1 is a sharp move. White 2 makes it easy for Black to win the fight.

Dia. 3. The problem is what happens when

White hanes at 2. The answer is the familiar tesuji of sacrificing two stones to get a squeeze. In this case, it's the 'stone tower' squeeze or *sekito-shibori*. Black wins the fight after 11. Note that if he plays 9 at 11, White connects at 1 and wins.




Dia. 2: Black wins



*Dia. 3: the stone-tower squeeze
9: at 1; 10: takes*


Answer to Problem 18

Dia. 1. The vulnerability of White's position is apparent at a glance. Even so, you must take care to attack him in a way that maximizes your profit. Neither Black 'a', answered by White 'b', nor Black 'c', answered by White 'd', is completely satisfactory.




Dia. 1: how to attack?


Dia. 2 (next page). The 'belly' contact play of 1 may be hard to find, but it gives the best result. White has to scramble to secure minimal eye shape, with just two points of territory in gote. This is painful for White, but he has no choice.



Dia. 2: correct



Dia. 3: good for Black




Dia. 3: White can't resist


Dia. 3. Resisting by connecting at 2 is unreasonable. After 3, White finds it impossible to build eye shape.

Answer to Problem 19

Dia. 1. Black 1 will be welcomed by White, as it helps him to live.



Dia. 1: White lives




Dia. 2: the tesuji

Dia. 2. Black 1 is a clever move. If White answers docilely at 2, he can't make eyes after 3.


Dia. 3. White will therefore resist with 2 and 4, but Black can be satisfied with taking corner profit with 5 and 7. White can't be proud of the way he has linked up on the edge.

Answer to Problem 20

Dia. 1. Attaching at the bottom of White's pillar of stones is the tesuji: this move contains threats on both sides. If White blocks at 2, to stop Black from pushing down at 'a', Black saves his five stones by capturing some white stones with 3 and 5. Instead of 2 –



Dia. 1: success



Dia. 2: success

Dia. 2. If White defends against 'a' by blocking on the other side with 2, Black counters with the exquisite tesuji of 3. If White 4, Black 5 sets up an *oi-otoshi* capture. Note that it would be a mistake for Black to atari at 'b' before playing any of these moves.

(Let's Go, September 1989).

Liu Zhongfu's Go Secrets

by John Fairbairn

One of the most important early go texts is the Chinese *Go Secrets* (*Qi Jue*) by Liu Zhongfu. It first appears in the early 12th century in the world's oldest surviving go anthology, the *Carefree and Innocent Pleasures Collection* (*Wang You Qing Le Ji*). Although perhaps overshadowed there by its much longer and better known companion, the *Go Classic in 13 Chapters* (*Qi Jing Shisan Pian*), *Go Secrets* deserves to be better known.

For one thing it is written by what we would today call a *meijin*. For another it is tightly focused on the game itself, unlike the *Go Classic*, which wanders off into astrology and go grades, for example.

Another attraction is that we have some games — though regrettably only a tiny handful — by Liu, so that we can see his theories in action.

I am presenting here (I believe for the first time in English) a translation of the *Go Secrets* and a game featuring Liu which seems to me to exemplify his theories, particularly as regards thickness and influence, and most of all on what to save or sacrifice (including the concept of 'potential' or *aji*, please note). It may be too much to say that he was the first to establish these concepts, but he was certainly capable of demonstrating their value.

Although 'thickness' never became a precisely defined concept in Chinese, being jumbled up with good shape, it was evidently understood by Liu and perhaps this was his distinguishing mark. 'Influence' was widely understood, however. So was the concept of 'save or sacrifice', which comes from the ancient Chinese military strategists, such as Sun Zi and Wu Zi referred to by Liu.

I suspect the latter, as a definite labelled concept, may be new to many go players brought up on Japanese go. In fact there is a large untapped vein of such new labels awaiting us in Chinese.


Difficult concepts or positions are usually difficult for most of us to understand without a handy label. Imagine where we would be without the label 'good shape'. Would we then

be aware that such a thing even existed? Yet this is the situation most chess players are in. I once asked Anatoly Karpov, then world chess champion, if he knew what I meant by 'good shape'. I was gratified to learn that it was precisely his understanding of 'good shape' that was his distinguishing mark. Other top chess players later confirmed to me that they knew all about good shape too, but this was apparently one of their professional 'Chess Secrets'.

The reputation of Carl Maria von Clausewitz was made not because he was himself a great general but because he labelled and imposed a structure on the elements of war. I cannot resist, therefore, comparing one of his central tenets with Liu Zhongfu. In *On War* (Vol. I, Book III, Chap. XI), Clausewitz said: 'The best Strategy is always to be very strong, first generally, then at the decisive point.' He saw the achievement of this concentration of strength as the central problem in the planning of a battle. The key to the maximization of strength was the efficient assembly of one's forces in space and time: in other words, 'good shape'.

As to the translation, there is an overwhelming argument (which I shall not make here) for translating Chinese go terms into English afresh, without going through Japanese. But for the time being I have eschewed explanations and inserted approximate Japanese equivalents where appropriate.

However, since a whole chapter of *Go Secrets* is devoted to 'incursions', a word of advance explanation does seem called for here. Not quite yet a technical term, they refer not to what we now understand as 'invasions' (*uchikomi*) inside large open areas, but to small-scale 'raids'. White 1 in *Dia. 1* is a typical example.



Dia. 1

It is important to remember too that ancient Chinese games began with two white and two black stones in opposing corners.

The final portion beginning 'Go resembles war' does not appear in *Carefree and Innocent Pleasures*, but comes from later anthologies. Incidentally, the final phrase in this section is not meant to be boastful, but is rather a justification of go to Confucian moralists as an educationally uplifting exercise.

The portions in italics are additional commentary, by whose hand is not clear. Presumably they were added by Li Yimin, the compiler of *Carefree and Innocent Pleasures*. They are often omitted in later editions.

The Go Secrets

by Liu Zhongfu

1. The opening

The opening stage of spreading pieces round the board is the first business of the game. It is like deploying troops at the front to await the enemy. The idea is to find the right balance in spacing out your pieces. Your positions should not be distorted, but the pieces should be close enough to help each other and the moves in the right order so that they work together.

Having approached close to the starting pieces, it is possible to extend three or four spaces. But while such extensions are strong as regards influence, they are easily attacked. As for slant (kosumi) or gliding (keima) kinds of moves, although they are strong in themselves, territorially they are cramped. The idea of a two-space extension is to find the balance between these.

If you approach the opponent's corner, play at the 3-6 or 6-3 point.

What this refers to is that there are three ways to proceed: a glide (keima) to the 4-2 point to invade the corner, a two-space extension back along the side, or a skip (ikken tobi) to the 6-5 point into the centre.

As to a move on the 9-3 or 10-3 point, your thinking should not be to hold to a fixed idea but to advance or retreat as appropriate.

The Secrets say: 'Do not extend too far — if you do, your pieces can be easily split. But do not play your pieces too near each other — if you do, your influence will be weak.' This is correct. A good go player does not cause difficulties for himself; he causes them for his opponent. The strong positions belong to him; the weak positions belong to the other player. This is what is meant by being an expert.

2. Incursions

In go a territory is never certain to be made, a group is never certain to be killed. You must adapt to changing circumstances and not rely on wishful thinking. Moreover, even when the opening deployment has been settled, strengths and weaknesses have not yet divided into solid positions. Ways of raiding and attacking the opponent's positions can then be effected at this stage. You must make your opponent defend himself and cover his cutting points or entice him to break off and join up his groups. Or pressurise him indirectly in various ways and then make an incursion.

The correct ways to make an incursion when approaching the corner are the push up (haneage), the slant (kosumi), the clamp (hasami) and the wedge (warikomi). The correct way to apply pressure is to use your influence to build up strength.

If your raid succeeds, the opponent's territory cannot but be cramped. If pressure is gradually built up, the opponent's influence cannot but be weakened. If you wait for the opponent to be provoked and make the first decisive movement, you can spy on him and assess his intentions, observe his movements and control the variations. This is what is meant by being good at responding.

3. Fighting

Using the techniques of fighting is not what go is really about. But if it is necessary to use them, the essential thing is to be modest and careful in order to defend and seal off your borders, to be disciplined and keep your positions intact. If you seal off your borders and defend well, then what you will have is solid strength. If your positions can be kept intact, then what you will have is reassuring

stability. If you use your solid strength to attack the opponent's weaknesses, or use your stability and wait for the opponent to overstretch himself, then whatever you attack you will destroy, whenever you fight you will prevail.

4. To save or to sacrifice

Decisions on what to save and what to sacrifice are a major element in go. After the hurly-burly of fighting, isolated pieces may be cut off and if it is not clear whether they should be saved or sacrificed, your anxieties will increase. In general, if you act decisively to settle the outcome it means you are saving them. But if you abandon them to secure influence it means you are sacrificing them.

If on the inside there is scope for a future surprise attack, or if on the outside there is scope for enhancing outside influence, then were you to liberate them there would be no resistance, and were you to defend them there would be no attack. Although such a group may be small, it is better to save it and protect it.




Fig. 1 (1-100)

If on the inside there is no room to scheme, or on the outside there is no room to rescue them, then were you to bring them out you would suffer all the more and only increase the opponent's influence, and were you to defend them you would be all the more perplexed and only strengthen the opponent's power. Although such a group may be large, it

is better to sacrifice it and allow it to wither away.

Go resembles war. Therefore I have written these four chapters, roughly corresponding to the *Art of War* manuals by Sun Zi and Wu Zi. For what the ancients said is: 'Faced with a timid enemy, elaborate your plans so as to take advantage of his weak points, ponder then strike without warning, act so as to resolve difficulties and eliminate uncertainties without delay. Circumstances are always changing and it may be hard to know whether to try simple or unusual tactics. But do not, through hesitation, spoil your chances of success. Do not, through grasping at small profits, harm your overall strategy.' These are not things the like of which people of shallow thoughts and poor reputation can discuss.

Meeting of Four Immortals in Chengdu

The game is from *Carefree and Innocent Pleasures*. It is a relay game involving what were probably the four best players of the time. First to move was Yang Zhonghe, second was Sun Shen, third Wang Jue, and fourth Liu Zhongfu. Thus Yang and Wang were Black.




Fig. 2 (101-200)

From another text we can date this game to the 10th day of the first moon, 1094. As official court go players, the four had probably followed the Emperor to Chengdu from his northern capital of Kaifeng, where most of the other games in *Carefree and Innocent Pleasures* were played. There was evidently a festive at-

mosphere about the game, which was played to the accompaniment of fine wine. That may explain why it is of rather better quality, to modern eyes, than many of the others.

The original text summarises the result as follows: 'White captures 9 black pieces and after filling in has 43 points. Black captures 7 white pieces and after filling in has 42 points.' Captured pieces (not stones: wood was used) here include dead pieces. Filling in refers to the normal endgame process of Japanese rules. The result was determined in those days, as in Japan now, by counting territory only, with the exception that two points (the two eyes) were subtracted for each group. Each player's score was thus territory minus prisoners surrendered — (2 x number of own live groups).

The result here, however, seems to be one point out. A white victory is ensured only if White gets to play at 'a' in Figure 3. Since the original gives no move there, they presumably assumed the centre point was white territory,

but Black 'a' would tie the game. I would hazard a guess that, since it was a fun relay game, Black deliberately let White have a nominal victory.




Fig. 3 (201-242)

Go World News

Continued from page 49

systems as the Japanese. The Strongest Players title is a case in point.

Perhaps taking a hint from the old Pro Best Ten title in Japan, this tournament starts with go fans voting for the ten most popular players. In the 5th title, the top ten were, in order: Nie, Ma, Qian, Liu, Yu, Cao, Zhang, Chen, Jiang, and Zheng. Qian is still sick and Jiang is in America, so their places were taken by Wang Qun and Wang Jianhong, who had taken 11th and 12th places.

The players were then split into two groups, which played two mini-leagues, held from 4 to 12 October 1991. The 1st, 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th place-getters went into one league. This was won by Nie with 3-1 (his only loss was to Zheng, who starred in the 5th Super Go series, defeating the first three Japanese players). The other league was won by Ma with 4-0.

The final stage is for the players finishing in the same place in each league to have a playoff (if players tie within a league, they play a fast game to break the tie). This stage was held in Beijing on 23 December and the final placings were:

1. Nie Weiping 9-dan
2. Ma Xiaochun 9-dan
3. Zhang Wendong 8-dan
4. Cao Dayuan 9-dan
5. Yu Bin 9-dan
6. Wang Jianhong 8-dan
7. Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan
8. Wang Qun 8-dan
9. Zheng Hong 7-dan
10. Chen Xinlin 8-dan.

The people who devised the Judan tournament in Japan would be proud of this tournament system.

Ma Wins King of Go

Completes Chinese Grand Slam

On 26 January, Ma Xiaochun 9-dan won the third game straight in the 3rd Qiwang (King of Go) title match, taking the title from Nie Weiping and becoming the first player to have won all seven of the major Chinese titles. The seven titles are: Mingren (= Meijin), Tianyuan (= Tengen), Qiwang (King of Go), New Physical Education Cup, All-China individual Championship, Ten Strongest Players, and the CCTV Cup.

THE GO PLAYER'S ALMANAC

The Most Up-to-Date and Comprehensive Reference Book on Go

Here is a book that belongs in every go player's library. Never before has so much information about go been gathered together in one place. In *The Go Player's Almanac* you will read about the origins of go in China, its transmission to and development in Japan, and its recent resurgence in China. You will also learn how to choose the best in go equipment, the meaning of commonly used go terms, and how the rules differ from country to country. As an added bonus, you will find brief biographical sketches of every important go player, both past and present.

And if you want to become a professional player and compete for hundreds of thousands of dollars in prize money, there is a section outlining the procedure you would have to go through to become eligible.

Finally, do you like to collect go trivia? Then how many of these questions can you answer?

Which player has won the most tournament games in a row?

Which professional player has won the most games in one year?

Who was the youngest player to become 9-dan?

Who was the oldest player to become 9-dan?

Can you play out the longest joseki?

What's the shortest joseki?

Who were the players in the shortest game ever played?

How many moves were there in the shortest counted game ever played?

How many moves did the longest game last?

You will find these facts and more in *The Go Player's Almanac*, all presented in a readable and entertaining style.

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